Middle East Peace Process
This is the blogspot of the Next Century Foundation's Working Group on the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). The Next Century Foundation is dedicated to working to build a climate of order and security in the world, to enable the pursuit of Peace and Reconciliation with Justice.
Updated: 1 hour 26 min ago
Unfairness from the UK
PALESTINIAN FARMERS DENIED VISAS BY THE UK GOVERNMENT FOR FAIRTRADE FORTNIGHT:
These farmers, whose olive oil is the only one in the world to carry the Fairtrade mark, have been invited by a UK social enterprise, Zaytoun, and were to be accompanied by a leading British NGO. The shocking refusal to allow those producers from newly certified Fairtrade Cooperatives into the UK to attend events across England, Wales and Scotland, comes exactly one year after this: Gordon Brown said he was "delighted" by the launch, marking the start of Fairtrade Fortnight, the annual campaign urging people to buy goods with the internationally recognised mark designed to ensure producers from poorer countries get a fair price and long-term security. Brown said: "Olive oil production provides an essential part of the West Bank economy. In buying this oil, British shoppers wil be helping the farmers of Palestine to make a living. "
PLEASE SIGN THIS PETITION TO TELL THE FCO TO ALLOW THESE FARMERS TO ATTEND FAIRTRADE FORTNIGHT.
http://www.ipetitions.com/petition/fairtradefarmersfrompalestine/
These farmers, whose olive oil is the only one in the world to carry the Fairtrade mark, have been invited by a UK social enterprise, Zaytoun, and were to be accompanied by a leading British NGO. The shocking refusal to allow those producers from newly certified Fairtrade Cooperatives into the UK to attend events across England, Wales and Scotland, comes exactly one year after this: Gordon Brown said he was "delighted" by the launch, marking the start of Fairtrade Fortnight, the annual campaign urging people to buy goods with the internationally recognised mark designed to ensure producers from poorer countries get a fair price and long-term security. Brown said: "Olive oil production provides an essential part of the West Bank economy. In buying this oil, British shoppers wil be helping the farmers of Palestine to make a living. "
PLEASE SIGN THIS PETITION TO TELL THE FCO TO ALLOW THESE FARMERS TO ATTEND FAIRTRADE FORTNIGHT.
http://www.ipetitions.com/petition/fairtradefarmersfrompalestine/
Hammas Summer Camps
Award winning Gaza journalist and NCF member, Adel Zanoon, writes to send us this:
GAZA CITY, June 17, 2009 (AFP) - Summer has arrived, school's out, and on the carpeted floor of a Gaza City mosque Ala al-Ramalawi is reciting the Koran to a group of 12-year-old girls in colourful veils.
For most of Gaza's children summer camp still means swimming, horseback riding and campfire songs.
But the number of children attending Hamas-run religious camps has soared in the two years since the group seized power, reflecting the growing religious awareness among the enclave's impoverished residents.
"There is no way for us but learning ... The enemy wants to condemn us to a siege and shelling and poverty," says Ramalawi, 16, who prides herself on having memorised the Koran but says she is not a member of Hamas.
Anwar Nassar, the director of the Koran camps, says Hamas supporters make up at most 60 percent of the youth who attend the camps, but that the total number of attendees has soared since the group seized power.
Since the takeover on June 15, 2007, Israel and Egypt have sealed Gaza off to all but limited humanitarian aid, crippling the local economy, fueling massive unemployment, and stalling reconstruction efforts.
Israel has insisted that the blockade is necessary to prevent Hamas -- which is backed by Iran and Syria and committed to the Jewish state's destruction -- from arming itself.
But human rights groups have slammed the restrictions as collective punishment of the overcrowded territory of 1.5 million people, where the vast majority of the population depends on foreign aid.
The lack of most building materials has meant that Gaza has recovered little from the devastating three-week Israeli offensive at the turn of the year that killed more than 1,400 Palestinians and 13 Israelis.
"The stronger the siege gets and the more frustration there is, the more it pushes the youth towards religiosity and Koranic studies," Nassar said.
More than 20,000 youth between the ages of 12 and 20 will attend the two-month-long religious summer camps this year, up from just 3,000 the year before, he said.
'No future for girls except to learn religion'
Another 100,000 are attending camps that Hamas says are purely recreational, according to Ayman Dalul, the director of the "Victory of Gaza for Jerusalem" camp.
"We will teach the participants arts, swimming, riding horses and history. There are other camps especially for scouts, technology and computers," he says, insisting that military training is not part of the curriculum.
Although many of the youth attending the camps are not Hamas supporters, the growth in interest in Islam serves the interests of the movement, which is committed to the destruction of Israel.
"Hamas is interested in the youth from childhood on," says Sheikh Hamza, a 22-year-old teacher with a long, scraggly beard, one of 1,200 instructors paid 250 dollars a month to teach the Koran and religious studies.
"Teaching the Koran is part of the religion. These are the generations that the movement will rely on for steadfastness and confronting enemies."
Hamas will spend more than 3.5 million dollars on the camps this year alongside its vast network of charities and other social programmes, with much of the funding coming from international Islamic charities.
Such activities, which date back to the movement's founding in the 1980s, have helped it to build up grass-roots political support and contributed to the increasing religious conservatism in Gaza in recent years.
Umm Mohammed, her face concealed beneath a long, black Saudi-style veil, proudly sends her three daughters to a Koranic camp held on the second floor of a mosque near her house.
"Every path is blocked," she says. "There is no future for girls except to learn the religion and the Koran in order to raise their children to serve Palestine and Islam. Everything brings frustration. We have to be stronger."
GAZA CITY, June 17, 2009 (AFP) - Summer has arrived, school's out, and on the carpeted floor of a Gaza City mosque Ala al-Ramalawi is reciting the Koran to a group of 12-year-old girls in colourful veils.
For most of Gaza's children summer camp still means swimming, horseback riding and campfire songs.
But the number of children attending Hamas-run religious camps has soared in the two years since the group seized power, reflecting the growing religious awareness among the enclave's impoverished residents.
"There is no way for us but learning ... The enemy wants to condemn us to a siege and shelling and poverty," says Ramalawi, 16, who prides herself on having memorised the Koran but says she is not a member of Hamas.
Anwar Nassar, the director of the Koran camps, says Hamas supporters make up at most 60 percent of the youth who attend the camps, but that the total number of attendees has soared since the group seized power.
Since the takeover on June 15, 2007, Israel and Egypt have sealed Gaza off to all but limited humanitarian aid, crippling the local economy, fueling massive unemployment, and stalling reconstruction efforts.
Israel has insisted that the blockade is necessary to prevent Hamas -- which is backed by Iran and Syria and committed to the Jewish state's destruction -- from arming itself.
But human rights groups have slammed the restrictions as collective punishment of the overcrowded territory of 1.5 million people, where the vast majority of the population depends on foreign aid.
The lack of most building materials has meant that Gaza has recovered little from the devastating three-week Israeli offensive at the turn of the year that killed more than 1,400 Palestinians and 13 Israelis.
"The stronger the siege gets and the more frustration there is, the more it pushes the youth towards religiosity and Koranic studies," Nassar said.
More than 20,000 youth between the ages of 12 and 20 will attend the two-month-long religious summer camps this year, up from just 3,000 the year before, he said.
'No future for girls except to learn religion'
Another 100,000 are attending camps that Hamas says are purely recreational, according to Ayman Dalul, the director of the "Victory of Gaza for Jerusalem" camp.
"We will teach the participants arts, swimming, riding horses and history. There are other camps especially for scouts, technology and computers," he says, insisting that military training is not part of the curriculum.
Although many of the youth attending the camps are not Hamas supporters, the growth in interest in Islam serves the interests of the movement, which is committed to the destruction of Israel.
"Hamas is interested in the youth from childhood on," says Sheikh Hamza, a 22-year-old teacher with a long, scraggly beard, one of 1,200 instructors paid 250 dollars a month to teach the Koran and religious studies.
"Teaching the Koran is part of the religion. These are the generations that the movement will rely on for steadfastness and confronting enemies."
Hamas will spend more than 3.5 million dollars on the camps this year alongside its vast network of charities and other social programmes, with much of the funding coming from international Islamic charities.
Such activities, which date back to the movement's founding in the 1980s, have helped it to build up grass-roots political support and contributed to the increasing religious conservatism in Gaza in recent years.
Umm Mohammed, her face concealed beneath a long, black Saudi-style veil, proudly sends her three daughters to a Koranic camp held on the second floor of a mosque near her house.
"Every path is blocked," she says. "There is no future for girls except to learn the religion and the Koran in order to raise their children to serve Palestine and Islam. Everything brings frustration. We have to be stronger."
Grassroots protests
Israeli momentum to have prisoner Gilad Shalit released has taken a new turn given that previous negotiations for the Marwan Barghouti /Shalit exchange seems to have faltered.
The focus of this alternate campaign is Hadarim Detention Centre - the prison which holds Fatah leader Barghouti. Protestors hope to block families of Palestinian prisoners from visiting their relatives inside. The argument for this: why should Palestinian prisoners be allowed visits when Shailt has not even had one visit since his capture in 2006 from Gaza.
Earlier this year the same Israeli group staged demonstrations outside the Israeli prime minister's residence and also tried to prevent fuel tanks from going into the Gaza Strip from Israel to try and make their point.
The visitation rights that the Palestinian prisoners have are believed to be one of the reasons why Hamas is under no pressure to negotiate a prisoner exchange. By bringing this protest movement to the grassroots level, Israeli’s are hoping that Palestinian mother’s will turn into their ambassadors, and champion the cause to have Shalit released.
Prince Turki and the Israeli
Danny Ayalon had the humility to apologise for his bad behaviour and that earned him a handshake from Prince Turki. Which is good. We should all manage more humility. Should we not? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
<strong>The RPS sent round this
The RPS sent round this interesting comment on a story about Israel's infiltration of Hamas:
A story published by Khaled Abu Toameh in the Jerusalem Post highlights the possibility that the Israeli intelligence may have infiltrated Hamas and the Syrian security apparatus as questions linger about the mysterious killing of a top Hamas operative in Dubai some two weeks ago.
When it comes to recruiting for the services of a high intelligence officer in Syria, or anywhere else for that matter, the reasons are not many. One either does it for money, ideology, or because you know the ship is sinking and you are hedging your bet.
To view article click here
A story published by Khaled Abu Toameh in the Jerusalem Post highlights the possibility that the Israeli intelligence may have infiltrated Hamas and the Syrian security apparatus as questions linger about the mysterious killing of a top Hamas operative in Dubai some two weeks ago.
When it comes to recruiting for the services of a high intelligence officer in Syria, or anywhere else for that matter, the reasons are not many. One either does it for money, ideology, or because you know the ship is sinking and you are hedging your bet.
To view article click here
The Transformation of Hamas
One of our board members writes: You may have seen this recent piece on Hamas. Somewhat rambling, but it should inspire your continued efforts to work with Hamas. Much of the author's info appears sourced from earlier in 2009 and before, but he offers a useful perspective. It might be read in light of Mish'al's comments earlier this week. Enjoy!
"The Transformation of Hamas" by Fawaz A. Gerges. Excerpts from an article that appeared in the January 25, 2010 edition of The Nation. The author is an LSE professor.
"Something is stirring within the Hamas body politic, a moderating trend that, if nourished and engaged, could transform Palestinian politics and the Arab-Israeli peace process.
There are unmistakable signs that the religiously based radical movement has subtly changed its uncompromising posture on Israel.
Although low-key and restrained, those shifts indicate that the movement is searching for a formula that addresses the concerns of Western powers yet avoids alienating its social base.
Far from impulsive and unexpected, Hamas's shift reflects a gradual evolution occurring over the past five years.
The big strategic turn occurred in 2005, when Hamas decided to participate in the January 2006 legislative elections and thus tacitly accepted the governing rules of the Palestinian Authority (PA), one of which includes recognition of Israel.
Ever since, top Hamas leaders have repeatedly declared they will accept a resolution of the conflict along the 1967 borders.
The Damascus-based Khaled Meshal, head of Hamas's political bureau and considered a hardliner, acknowledged as much in 2008.
Pressed by an Australian journalist on policy changes Hamas might make, Meshal asserted that the organization has shifted on several key points including acceptance of the national accords for a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders and participation in the 2006 elections.
Another senior Hamas leader, Ghazi Hamad, was more specific than Meshal, telling journalists in January 2009 that Hamas would be satisfied with ending Israeli control over the Palestinian areas occupied in the 1967 war--the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem.
In other words, Hamas would not hold out for liberation of the land that currently includes Israel.
Previously Hamas moderates had called at times for a tahdia (a minor truce, or calm") or hudna (a longer-term truce, lasting as long as fifty years), which implies some measure of recognition, if only tacit.
The moderates justified their policy shift by using Islamic terms (in Islamic history hudnas sometimes develop into permanent truces). Now leaders appear to be going further; they have made a concerted effort to re-educate the rank and file about the necessity of living side by side with their Jewish neighbors, and in so doing mentally prepare them for a permanent settlement.
In Gaza's mosques pro-Hamas clerics have begun to cite the example of the famed twelfth-century Muslim military commander and statesman Saladin, who after liberating Jerusalem from the Crusaders allowed them to retain a coastal state in the Levant.
The point is that if Saladin could tolerate the warring, bloodthirsty Crusaders, then today's Palestinians should be willing to live peacefully with a Jewish state in their midst.
The Saladin story is important because it provides Hamas with religious legitimacy and allows it to justify the change of direction to followers.
Hamas's raison d'être rests on religious legitimation; its leaders understand that they neglect this at their peril. Western leaders and students of international politics should acknowledge that Hamas can no more abandon its commitment to Islamism than the United States can abandon its commitment to liberal democracy.
It should be emphasized that Hamas is not monolithic on the issue of peace. There are multiple, clashing view-points and constituencies within the movement.
Several factors have played a role in the transformation. They include the burden of governing a war-torn Gaza and the devastation from Israel's 2008-09 attack, which has caused incalculable human suffering and increasing public dissatisfaction in Gaza with Hamas rule.
Before the 2006 parliamentary elections, Hamas was known for its suicide bombers, not its bureaucrats, even though between 2002 and 2006 the organization moved from rejectionism toward participation in a political framework that is a direct product of the Oslo peace process of the 1990s. After the elections, the shift continued.
Hamas is not just a political party. It's a social movement, and as such it has a long record of concern about and close attention to public opinion. Given the gravity of deteriorating conditions in Gaza and Hamas's weak performance during last year's fighting, it should be no surprise that the organization has undergone a period of fairly intense soul-searching and reassessment of strategic options.
Ironically, despite the West's refusal to regard the Hamas government as legitimate and despite the continuing brutal siege of Gaza, demands for democratic governance within Gaza are driving change.
Yet Hamas leaders are fully aware of the danger of alienating more-hardline factions if they show weakness or water down their position and move toward de facto recognition of Israel without getting something substantive in return. This difficult balance often explains the tensions and contradictions in Hamas's public and private pronouncements
What is striking about Hamas's shift toward the peace process is that it has come at a time of critical challenges from Al Qaeda-like jihadist groups; a low-intensity civil war with rival Fatah, the ruling party of the PA; and a deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza.
Last summer a militant group called Jund Ansar Allah, or the Warriors of God, one of a handful of Al Qaeda-inspired factions, declared the establishment of an Islamic emirate in Gaza--a flagrant rejection of Hamas's authority. Hamas security forces struck instantly and mercilessly at the Warriors, killing more than twenty members, including the group's leader, Abdel-Latif Moussa.
In one stroke, the Hamas leadership sent a message to foes and friends alike that it will not tolerate global jihadist groups like Al Qaeda, which want to turn Gaza into a theater of transnational jihad.
Despite the crushing of Moussa's outfit, the extremist challenge persists. The Israeli siege, in place since 2006, along with the suffering and despair it has caused among Gaza's 1.4 million inhabitants, has driven hundreds of young Palestinians into the arms of small Salafist extremist factions that accuse Hamas of forfeiting the armed struggle and failing to implement Shariah law.
Hamas leaders appear to be worried about the proliferation of these factions and
have instructed clerics to warn worshipers against joining such bands.
Compared with these puritanical and nihilistic groups, Hamas is well within the
mainstream of Islamist politics.
Operationally and ideologically, there are huge differences between Hamas and jihadi extremists such as Al Qaeda--and there's a lot of bad blood. Hamas is a broad-based religious/nationalist resistance whose focus and violence is limited to Palestine/Israel, while Al Qaeda is a small, transnational terrorist network
that has carried out attacks worldwide.
Al Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri have vehemently criticized Hamas for its willingness to play politics and negotiate with Israel.
Hamas leaders have responded that they know what is good for their people, and they have made it crystal clear they have no interest in transnational militancy. Their overriding goal is political and nationalist rather than ideological and global: to empower Palestinians and liberate the occupied Palestinian territories.
Unlike Al Qaeda and other fringe factions, Hamas is a viable social movement with an extensive social network and a large popular base that has been estimated at several hundred thousand.
Given its tradition of sensitivity and responsiveness to Palestinian public opinion, a convincing argument could be made that the recent changes in the organization's conduct can be attributed to the high levels of poverty, unemployment and isolation of Palestinians in Gaza, who fear an even greater deterioration of conditions there.
A further example of Hamas's political and social priorities is its decision to
agree in principle to an Egyptian-brokered deal that sketches out a path to peace with Fatah.
After two years of bitter and violent division, the warring parties came very close to agreement in October. The deal collapsed at the last moment, but talks continue.
There are two points to make about the Egyptian role:
¤ First, Hamas leaders say they feel somewhat betrayed by the Egyptians because
after pressure from the Americans, Cairo unilaterally revised the final agreed-upon text without consulting the Hamas negotiating team.
¤ Second, many Palestinian and Arab observers think Egypt is in no hurry to conclude the Fatah-Hamas talks. They contend that faced with regional challenges and rivals (Iran, Turkey, Syria and Saudi Arabia), the Mubarak regime views its brokering process in the Palestinian-Israeli theater as an important regional asset and a way to solidify its relationship with Washington.
Despite its frequently reactionary rhetoric, Hamas is a rational actor, a conclusion reached by former Mossad chief Ephraim Halevy, who also served as Ariel Sharon's national security adviser and who is certainly not a peacenik.
The Hamas leadership has undergone a transformation "right under our very noses"
by recognizing that "its ideological goal is not attainable and will not be in
the foreseeable future," Halevy wrote in the Israeli daily Yediot Ahronot just
before the 2008 attack on Gaza. He believes Hamas is ready and willing to accept
the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders.
The US Army Strategic Studies Institute published a similar analysis just before
the Israeli offensive, concluding that Hamas was considering a shift of its
position and that "Israel's stance toward [Hamas]...has been a major obstacle to
substantive peacemaking."
Indeed, it could be argued that Hamas has moved closer to a vision of peace consistent with international law and consensus (two separate states in historic
Palestine, divided more or less along the '67 borders with East Jerusalem as the
capital of Palestine, and recognition of all states in the region) than the current Israeli governing coalition.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu vehemently opposes the establishment of a genuinely viable Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, and is opposed to
giving up any part of Jerusalem--and Netanyahu's governing coalition is more right wing and pro-settlement than he is.
Hamas's political evolution and deepening moderation stand in stark contrast to
the rejectionism of the Netanyahu government and call into question which parties are "hardline" and which are "extremist."
And at the regional level, a sea change has occurred in the official Arab position toward the Jewish state (the Arab League's 2002 Beirut Declaration, subsequently reiterated, offers full recognition and diplomatic relations if Israel accepts the international consensus regarding a two-state solution), while the attitudes of the Israeli ruling elite have hardened. This marks a transformation of regional politics and a reversal of roles.
Observers might ask, If Hamas is so eager to accept a two-state solution, why doesn't it simply accept the three conditions for engagement required by the so-called diplomatic Quartet (the United States, Russia, the European Union and
the United Nations): recognition of Israel, renunciation of violence and acceptance of all previous agreements (primarily, the Oslo Accords)? In my interviews with Hamas officials, they stress that while they have made significant concessions to the Quartet, it has not lifted the punishing sanctions against Hamas, nor has it pressed Israel to end its siege, which has caused a dire humanitarian crisis.
In addition, Hamas leaders believe that recognition of Israel is the last card
in their hand and are reluctant to play it before talks even begin. Their diplomatic starting point will be to demand that Israel recognize the national rights of the Palestinians and withdraw from the occupied territories--but it will not be their final position.
There can be no viable, lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians if Hamas is not consulted and if the Palestinians remain divided, with two warring authorities in the West Bank and Gaza. Hamas has the means and public support to
undermine any agreement that does not address the legitimate rights and claims
of the Palestinian people. Its Fatah/PA rival lacks a popular mandate and the
legitimacy needed to implement a resolution of the conflict.
PA President Mahmoud Abbas has been weakened by a series of blunders of his own
making, and with his moral authority compromised in the eyes of a sizable Palestinian constituency, Abbas is yesterday's man--no matter how long he remains in power as a lame duck, and whether or not he competes in the upcoming presidential elections.
If the United States and Europe engaged Hamas, encouraging it to continue moderating its views instead of ignoring it or, worse yet, seeking its overthrow, the West could test the extent of Hamas's evolution.
So far the strategy of isolation and military confrontation--pursued in tandem
by Israel and the United States--has not appeared to weaken Hamas significantly.
If anything, it has radicalized hundreds of young Palestinians, who have joined
extremist factions and reinforced the culture of martyrdom and nihilism.
All the while, the siege of Gaza has left a trail of untold pain and suffering.
If the Western powers don't engage Hamas, they will never know if it can evolve
into an open, tolerant and peaceful social movement.
The jury is still out on whether the Islamist movement can make that painful and
ideologically costly transition. But the claim that engaging Hamas legitimizes
it does not carry much weight; the organization derives its legitimacy from the
Palestinian people, a mandate resoundingly confirmed in the free and fair elections of 2006.
To break the impasse and prevent gains by more extremist factions, the Obama
administration and Congress should support a unified Palestinian government that
could negotiate peace with Israel.
Whatever they think of its ideology, US officials should acknowledge that Hamas
is a legitimately elected representative of the Palestinian people, and that any
treaty signed by a rump Fatah/PA will not withstand the test of time.
And instead of twisting Cairo's arms in a rejectionist direction, Washington
should encourage its Egyptian ally to broker a truce between Hamas and Fatah and
thus repair the badly frayed Palestinian governing institutions.
If the Obama administration continues to shun engagement with Hamas, Europe ought to take the lead in establishing an official connection. European governments have already dealt with Lebanon's Hezbollah, a group similar to Hamas in some respects, and they possess the skills, experience and political weight to help broker a viable peace settlement.
Like it or not, Hamas is the most powerful organization in the occupied territories. It is deeply entrenched in Palestinian society. Neither Israel nor the Western powers can wish it away.
The good news, if my reading is correct, is that Hamas has changed, is willing
to meet some of the Quartet's conditions and is making domestic political preparations for further changes.
But if Hamas is not engaged, and if the siege of Gaza and Palestinian suffering
continue without hope of ending the political impasse, there is a real danger of
a regional war."
"The Transformation of Hamas" by Fawaz A. Gerges. Excerpts from an article that appeared in the January 25, 2010 edition of The Nation. The author is an LSE professor.
"Something is stirring within the Hamas body politic, a moderating trend that, if nourished and engaged, could transform Palestinian politics and the Arab-Israeli peace process.
There are unmistakable signs that the religiously based radical movement has subtly changed its uncompromising posture on Israel.
Although low-key and restrained, those shifts indicate that the movement is searching for a formula that addresses the concerns of Western powers yet avoids alienating its social base.
Far from impulsive and unexpected, Hamas's shift reflects a gradual evolution occurring over the past five years.
The big strategic turn occurred in 2005, when Hamas decided to participate in the January 2006 legislative elections and thus tacitly accepted the governing rules of the Palestinian Authority (PA), one of which includes recognition of Israel.
Ever since, top Hamas leaders have repeatedly declared they will accept a resolution of the conflict along the 1967 borders.
The Damascus-based Khaled Meshal, head of Hamas's political bureau and considered a hardliner, acknowledged as much in 2008.
Pressed by an Australian journalist on policy changes Hamas might make, Meshal asserted that the organization has shifted on several key points including acceptance of the national accords for a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders and participation in the 2006 elections.
Another senior Hamas leader, Ghazi Hamad, was more specific than Meshal, telling journalists in January 2009 that Hamas would be satisfied with ending Israeli control over the Palestinian areas occupied in the 1967 war--the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem.
In other words, Hamas would not hold out for liberation of the land that currently includes Israel.
Previously Hamas moderates had called at times for a tahdia (a minor truce, or calm") or hudna (a longer-term truce, lasting as long as fifty years), which implies some measure of recognition, if only tacit.
The moderates justified their policy shift by using Islamic terms (in Islamic history hudnas sometimes develop into permanent truces). Now leaders appear to be going further; they have made a concerted effort to re-educate the rank and file about the necessity of living side by side with their Jewish neighbors, and in so doing mentally prepare them for a permanent settlement.
In Gaza's mosques pro-Hamas clerics have begun to cite the example of the famed twelfth-century Muslim military commander and statesman Saladin, who after liberating Jerusalem from the Crusaders allowed them to retain a coastal state in the Levant.
The point is that if Saladin could tolerate the warring, bloodthirsty Crusaders, then today's Palestinians should be willing to live peacefully with a Jewish state in their midst.
The Saladin story is important because it provides Hamas with religious legitimacy and allows it to justify the change of direction to followers.
Hamas's raison d'être rests on religious legitimation; its leaders understand that they neglect this at their peril. Western leaders and students of international politics should acknowledge that Hamas can no more abandon its commitment to Islamism than the United States can abandon its commitment to liberal democracy.
It should be emphasized that Hamas is not monolithic on the issue of peace. There are multiple, clashing view-points and constituencies within the movement.
Several factors have played a role in the transformation. They include the burden of governing a war-torn Gaza and the devastation from Israel's 2008-09 attack, which has caused incalculable human suffering and increasing public dissatisfaction in Gaza with Hamas rule.
Before the 2006 parliamentary elections, Hamas was known for its suicide bombers, not its bureaucrats, even though between 2002 and 2006 the organization moved from rejectionism toward participation in a political framework that is a direct product of the Oslo peace process of the 1990s. After the elections, the shift continued.
Hamas is not just a political party. It's a social movement, and as such it has a long record of concern about and close attention to public opinion. Given the gravity of deteriorating conditions in Gaza and Hamas's weak performance during last year's fighting, it should be no surprise that the organization has undergone a period of fairly intense soul-searching and reassessment of strategic options.
Ironically, despite the West's refusal to regard the Hamas government as legitimate and despite the continuing brutal siege of Gaza, demands for democratic governance within Gaza are driving change.
Yet Hamas leaders are fully aware of the danger of alienating more-hardline factions if they show weakness or water down their position and move toward de facto recognition of Israel without getting something substantive in return. This difficult balance often explains the tensions and contradictions in Hamas's public and private pronouncements
What is striking about Hamas's shift toward the peace process is that it has come at a time of critical challenges from Al Qaeda-like jihadist groups; a low-intensity civil war with rival Fatah, the ruling party of the PA; and a deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza.
Last summer a militant group called Jund Ansar Allah, or the Warriors of God, one of a handful of Al Qaeda-inspired factions, declared the establishment of an Islamic emirate in Gaza--a flagrant rejection of Hamas's authority. Hamas security forces struck instantly and mercilessly at the Warriors, killing more than twenty members, including the group's leader, Abdel-Latif Moussa.
In one stroke, the Hamas leadership sent a message to foes and friends alike that it will not tolerate global jihadist groups like Al Qaeda, which want to turn Gaza into a theater of transnational jihad.
Despite the crushing of Moussa's outfit, the extremist challenge persists. The Israeli siege, in place since 2006, along with the suffering and despair it has caused among Gaza's 1.4 million inhabitants, has driven hundreds of young Palestinians into the arms of small Salafist extremist factions that accuse Hamas of forfeiting the armed struggle and failing to implement Shariah law.
Hamas leaders appear to be worried about the proliferation of these factions and
have instructed clerics to warn worshipers against joining such bands.
Compared with these puritanical and nihilistic groups, Hamas is well within the
mainstream of Islamist politics.
Operationally and ideologically, there are huge differences between Hamas and jihadi extremists such as Al Qaeda--and there's a lot of bad blood. Hamas is a broad-based religious/nationalist resistance whose focus and violence is limited to Palestine/Israel, while Al Qaeda is a small, transnational terrorist network
that has carried out attacks worldwide.
Al Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri have vehemently criticized Hamas for its willingness to play politics and negotiate with Israel.
Hamas leaders have responded that they know what is good for their people, and they have made it crystal clear they have no interest in transnational militancy. Their overriding goal is political and nationalist rather than ideological and global: to empower Palestinians and liberate the occupied Palestinian territories.
Unlike Al Qaeda and other fringe factions, Hamas is a viable social movement with an extensive social network and a large popular base that has been estimated at several hundred thousand.
Given its tradition of sensitivity and responsiveness to Palestinian public opinion, a convincing argument could be made that the recent changes in the organization's conduct can be attributed to the high levels of poverty, unemployment and isolation of Palestinians in Gaza, who fear an even greater deterioration of conditions there.
A further example of Hamas's political and social priorities is its decision to
agree in principle to an Egyptian-brokered deal that sketches out a path to peace with Fatah.
After two years of bitter and violent division, the warring parties came very close to agreement in October. The deal collapsed at the last moment, but talks continue.
There are two points to make about the Egyptian role:
¤ First, Hamas leaders say they feel somewhat betrayed by the Egyptians because
after pressure from the Americans, Cairo unilaterally revised the final agreed-upon text without consulting the Hamas negotiating team.
¤ Second, many Palestinian and Arab observers think Egypt is in no hurry to conclude the Fatah-Hamas talks. They contend that faced with regional challenges and rivals (Iran, Turkey, Syria and Saudi Arabia), the Mubarak regime views its brokering process in the Palestinian-Israeli theater as an important regional asset and a way to solidify its relationship with Washington.
Despite its frequently reactionary rhetoric, Hamas is a rational actor, a conclusion reached by former Mossad chief Ephraim Halevy, who also served as Ariel Sharon's national security adviser and who is certainly not a peacenik.
The Hamas leadership has undergone a transformation "right under our very noses"
by recognizing that "its ideological goal is not attainable and will not be in
the foreseeable future," Halevy wrote in the Israeli daily Yediot Ahronot just
before the 2008 attack on Gaza. He believes Hamas is ready and willing to accept
the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders.
The US Army Strategic Studies Institute published a similar analysis just before
the Israeli offensive, concluding that Hamas was considering a shift of its
position and that "Israel's stance toward [Hamas]...has been a major obstacle to
substantive peacemaking."
Indeed, it could be argued that Hamas has moved closer to a vision of peace consistent with international law and consensus (two separate states in historic
Palestine, divided more or less along the '67 borders with East Jerusalem as the
capital of Palestine, and recognition of all states in the region) than the current Israeli governing coalition.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu vehemently opposes the establishment of a genuinely viable Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, and is opposed to
giving up any part of Jerusalem--and Netanyahu's governing coalition is more right wing and pro-settlement than he is.
Hamas's political evolution and deepening moderation stand in stark contrast to
the rejectionism of the Netanyahu government and call into question which parties are "hardline" and which are "extremist."
And at the regional level, a sea change has occurred in the official Arab position toward the Jewish state (the Arab League's 2002 Beirut Declaration, subsequently reiterated, offers full recognition and diplomatic relations if Israel accepts the international consensus regarding a two-state solution), while the attitudes of the Israeli ruling elite have hardened. This marks a transformation of regional politics and a reversal of roles.
Observers might ask, If Hamas is so eager to accept a two-state solution, why doesn't it simply accept the three conditions for engagement required by the so-called diplomatic Quartet (the United States, Russia, the European Union and
the United Nations): recognition of Israel, renunciation of violence and acceptance of all previous agreements (primarily, the Oslo Accords)? In my interviews with Hamas officials, they stress that while they have made significant concessions to the Quartet, it has not lifted the punishing sanctions against Hamas, nor has it pressed Israel to end its siege, which has caused a dire humanitarian crisis.
In addition, Hamas leaders believe that recognition of Israel is the last card
in their hand and are reluctant to play it before talks even begin. Their diplomatic starting point will be to demand that Israel recognize the national rights of the Palestinians and withdraw from the occupied territories--but it will not be their final position.
There can be no viable, lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians if Hamas is not consulted and if the Palestinians remain divided, with two warring authorities in the West Bank and Gaza. Hamas has the means and public support to
undermine any agreement that does not address the legitimate rights and claims
of the Palestinian people. Its Fatah/PA rival lacks a popular mandate and the
legitimacy needed to implement a resolution of the conflict.
PA President Mahmoud Abbas has been weakened by a series of blunders of his own
making, and with his moral authority compromised in the eyes of a sizable Palestinian constituency, Abbas is yesterday's man--no matter how long he remains in power as a lame duck, and whether or not he competes in the upcoming presidential elections.
If the United States and Europe engaged Hamas, encouraging it to continue moderating its views instead of ignoring it or, worse yet, seeking its overthrow, the West could test the extent of Hamas's evolution.
So far the strategy of isolation and military confrontation--pursued in tandem
by Israel and the United States--has not appeared to weaken Hamas significantly.
If anything, it has radicalized hundreds of young Palestinians, who have joined
extremist factions and reinforced the culture of martyrdom and nihilism.
All the while, the siege of Gaza has left a trail of untold pain and suffering.
If the Western powers don't engage Hamas, they will never know if it can evolve
into an open, tolerant and peaceful social movement.
The jury is still out on whether the Islamist movement can make that painful and
ideologically costly transition. But the claim that engaging Hamas legitimizes
it does not carry much weight; the organization derives its legitimacy from the
Palestinian people, a mandate resoundingly confirmed in the free and fair elections of 2006.
To break the impasse and prevent gains by more extremist factions, the Obama
administration and Congress should support a unified Palestinian government that
could negotiate peace with Israel.
Whatever they think of its ideology, US officials should acknowledge that Hamas
is a legitimately elected representative of the Palestinian people, and that any
treaty signed by a rump Fatah/PA will not withstand the test of time.
And instead of twisting Cairo's arms in a rejectionist direction, Washington
should encourage its Egyptian ally to broker a truce between Hamas and Fatah and
thus repair the badly frayed Palestinian governing institutions.
If the Obama administration continues to shun engagement with Hamas, Europe ought to take the lead in establishing an official connection. European governments have already dealt with Lebanon's Hezbollah, a group similar to Hamas in some respects, and they possess the skills, experience and political weight to help broker a viable peace settlement.
Like it or not, Hamas is the most powerful organization in the occupied territories. It is deeply entrenched in Palestinian society. Neither Israel nor the Western powers can wish it away.
The good news, if my reading is correct, is that Hamas has changed, is willing
to meet some of the Quartet's conditions and is making domestic political preparations for further changes.
But if Hamas is not engaged, and if the siege of Gaza and Palestinian suffering
continue without hope of ending the political impasse, there is a real danger of
a regional war."
Judge denies injunction for Jared
Soraya sends this disturbing item that impacts severely on freedom of the press:
On Wednesday night, Ma'an attorney Castro Daoud filed an injunction in a Tel Aviv court to delay the deportation of Jared Malsin, Chief Editor for the English Desk at Ma'an News Agency, the largest news network in the Palestinian territories. Israel's attorney general denied the request aproximately an hour after it was filed.
The injunction was denied with difinitive terminology. There remains a slim chance that a judge could overrule the attorney general.
Jared Malsin, an American citizen, was detained upon arrival at Israel's Ben Gurion International Airport near Tel Aviv at 4pm on Tuesday, 12 January 2009. He was interrogated for eight hours in a detention hall at the airoprt during which time he had no access to a lawyer or his consulate. He is now scheduled for deportation to Prague at 6:05 am on Thursday, 14 January 2010.
US Embassy staff have registered objections with the Israeli authorities over Malsin's detention, which appeared to be politically motivated. Dutch officials, whose government provided some of Ma'an's initial funding in 2005, expressed similar alarm in a letter that the US Embassy passed to Israel from Jack Twiss Quarles van Ufford, the head of the Representative Office of The Netherlands to the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah.
Israeli security agents have prevented Malsin from taking calls, and for hours lied to concerned US consular staff, initially denying that he was even being held. In what could only be explained as a retaliatory measure for Malsin's reporting in Palestine, his long-term partner, Faith Rowold, a two-year volunteer with the Lutheran Church in Jerusalem, was also placed in a separate holding cell pending deportation. They have not been permitted contact ever since.
Nevertheless, foreign diplomats say there is little they can do in cases where Israel cites "security reasons" for denying a foreign-passport holder's entry, although it has yet to specify any allegations in Malsin's case. Israeli security officials, meanwhile, have quietly expressed concern to Ma'an over this latest exercise of power by the Interior Ministry.
Ma'an scrupulously maintains its editorial independence and aims to promote access to information, freedom of expression, press freedom, and media pluralism in Palestine. It has no other agenda. Israel's arbitrary detention of the head of its English Desk is an affront to journalists not only in Palestine, but also in Israel and abroad, who rely on Ma'an for its accuracy, impartiality, and independence.
For more information, please contact: George Hale (English)+972(0)52.785-4907 Raed Othman (Arabic)+972(0)59.925-8704 Hakim Abdul Salah (Hebrew)+972(0)59.895-1151
On Wednesday night, Ma'an attorney Castro Daoud filed an injunction in a Tel Aviv court to delay the deportation of Jared Malsin, Chief Editor for the English Desk at Ma'an News Agency, the largest news network in the Palestinian territories. Israel's attorney general denied the request aproximately an hour after it was filed.
The injunction was denied with difinitive terminology. There remains a slim chance that a judge could overrule the attorney general.
Jared Malsin, an American citizen, was detained upon arrival at Israel's Ben Gurion International Airport near Tel Aviv at 4pm on Tuesday, 12 January 2009. He was interrogated for eight hours in a detention hall at the airoprt during which time he had no access to a lawyer or his consulate. He is now scheduled for deportation to Prague at 6:05 am on Thursday, 14 January 2010.
US Embassy staff have registered objections with the Israeli authorities over Malsin's detention, which appeared to be politically motivated. Dutch officials, whose government provided some of Ma'an's initial funding in 2005, expressed similar alarm in a letter that the US Embassy passed to Israel from Jack Twiss Quarles van Ufford, the head of the Representative Office of The Netherlands to the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah.
Israeli security agents have prevented Malsin from taking calls, and for hours lied to concerned US consular staff, initially denying that he was even being held. In what could only be explained as a retaliatory measure for Malsin's reporting in Palestine, his long-term partner, Faith Rowold, a two-year volunteer with the Lutheran Church in Jerusalem, was also placed in a separate holding cell pending deportation. They have not been permitted contact ever since.
Nevertheless, foreign diplomats say there is little they can do in cases where Israel cites "security reasons" for denying a foreign-passport holder's entry, although it has yet to specify any allegations in Malsin's case. Israeli security officials, meanwhile, have quietly expressed concern to Ma'an over this latest exercise of power by the Interior Ministry.
Ma'an scrupulously maintains its editorial independence and aims to promote access to information, freedom of expression, press freedom, and media pluralism in Palestine. It has no other agenda. Israel's arbitrary detention of the head of its English Desk is an affront to journalists not only in Palestine, but also in Israel and abroad, who rely on Ma'an for its accuracy, impartiality, and independence.
For more information, please contact: George Hale (English)+972(0)52.785-4907 Raed Othman (Arabic)+972(0)59.925-8704 Hakim Abdul Salah (Hebrew)+972(0)59.895-1151
Judge denies injunction for Jared
Soraya sends this disturbing item that impacts severely on freedom of the press:
On Wednesday night, Ma'an attorney Castro Daoud filed an injunction in a Tel Aviv court to delay the deportation of Jared Malsin, Chief Editor for the English Desk at Ma'an News Agency, the largest news network in the Palestinian territories. Israel's attorney general denied the request aproximately an hour after it was filed.
The injunction was denied with difinitive terminology. There remains a slim chance that a judge could overrule the attorney general.
Jared Malsin, an American citizen, was detained upon arrival at Israel's Ben Gurion International Airport near Tel Aviv at 4pm on Tuesday, 12 January 2009. He was interrogated for eight hours in a detention hall at the airoprt during which time he had no access to a lawyer or his consulate. He is now scheduled for deportation to Prague at 6:05 am on Thursday, 14 January 2010.
US Embassy staff have registered objections with the Israeli authorities over Malsin's detention, which appeared to be politically motivated. Dutch officials, whose government provided some of Ma'an's initial funding in 2005, expressed similar alarm in a letter that the US Embassy passed to Israel from Jack Twiss Quarles van Ufford, the head of the Representative Office of The Netherlands to the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah.
Israeli security agents have prevented Malsin from taking calls, and for hours lied to concerned US consular staff, initially denying that he was even being held. In what could only be explained as a retaliatory measure for Malsin's reporting in Palestine, his long-term partner, Faith Rowold, a two-year volunteer with the Lutheran Church in Jerusalem, was also placed in a separate holding cell pending deportation. They have not been permitted contact ever since.
Nevertheless, foreign diplomats say there is little they can do in cases where Israel cites "security reasons" for denying a foreign-passport holder's entry, although it has yet to specify any allegations in Malsin's case. Israeli security officials, meanwhile, have quietly expressed concern to Ma'an over this latest exercise of power by the Interior Ministry.
Ma'an scrupulously maintains its editorial independence and aims to promote access to information, freedom of expression, press freedom, and media pluralism in Palestine. It has no other agenda. Israel's arbitrary detention of the head of its English Desk is an affront to journalists not only in Palestine, but also in Israel and abroad, who rely on Ma'an for its accuracy, impartiality, and independence.
For more information, please contact: George Hale (English)+972(0)52.785-4907 Raed Othman (Arabic)+972(0)59.925-8704 Hakim Abdul Salah (Hebrew)+972(0)59.895-1151
On Wednesday night, Ma'an attorney Castro Daoud filed an injunction in a Tel Aviv court to delay the deportation of Jared Malsin, Chief Editor for the English Desk at Ma'an News Agency, the largest news network in the Palestinian territories. Israel's attorney general denied the request aproximately an hour after it was filed.
The injunction was denied with difinitive terminology. There remains a slim chance that a judge could overrule the attorney general.
Jared Malsin, an American citizen, was detained upon arrival at Israel's Ben Gurion International Airport near Tel Aviv at 4pm on Tuesday, 12 January 2009. He was interrogated for eight hours in a detention hall at the airoprt during which time he had no access to a lawyer or his consulate. He is now scheduled for deportation to Prague at 6:05 am on Thursday, 14 January 2010.
US Embassy staff have registered objections with the Israeli authorities over Malsin's detention, which appeared to be politically motivated. Dutch officials, whose government provided some of Ma'an's initial funding in 2005, expressed similar alarm in a letter that the US Embassy passed to Israel from Jack Twiss Quarles van Ufford, the head of the Representative Office of The Netherlands to the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah.
Israeli security agents have prevented Malsin from taking calls, and for hours lied to concerned US consular staff, initially denying that he was even being held. In what could only be explained as a retaliatory measure for Malsin's reporting in Palestine, his long-term partner, Faith Rowold, a two-year volunteer with the Lutheran Church in Jerusalem, was also placed in a separate holding cell pending deportation. They have not been permitted contact ever since.
Nevertheless, foreign diplomats say there is little they can do in cases where Israel cites "security reasons" for denying a foreign-passport holder's entry, although it has yet to specify any allegations in Malsin's case. Israeli security officials, meanwhile, have quietly expressed concern to Ma'an over this latest exercise of power by the Interior Ministry.
Ma'an scrupulously maintains its editorial independence and aims to promote access to information, freedom of expression, press freedom, and media pluralism in Palestine. It has no other agenda. Israel's arbitrary detention of the head of its English Desk is an affront to journalists not only in Palestine, but also in Israel and abroad, who rely on Ma'an for its accuracy, impartiality, and independence.
For more information, please contact: George Hale (English)+972(0)52.785-4907 Raed Othman (Arabic)+972(0)59.925-8704 Hakim Abdul Salah (Hebrew)+972(0)59.895-1151
Poor pathetic Gaza
Things are now so bad in Gaza - and the rest of the world just turns its back having never done more than weep crocodile tears. NCF member Sami sent us this today:
This is not humane. We need dignity
A year on from Operation Cast Lead, the Gaza blockade is preventing people from leading a minimally respectable civil life
Sami Abdel-Shafi
The Guardian, Tuesday 29 December 2009
Article history
On my way to visit a friend in the Abed Rabbo district, north of the Gaza Strip, the taxi driver handed me a small pack of biscuits for change. There are nearly no copper coins left here so cab drivers barter a half Israeli shekel for biscuits brought in from the tunnels between the southern city of Rafah and Egypt's northern Sinai. Some Gazans, who once earned a respectable living, resorted to melting coins and sold the copper for food supplies.
This was not the first time I was forced into arcane methods of barter. A few weeks ago I was told that oil filters for our British-made electricity generator could only be brought in through the tunnels. One alternative was to fit a refurbished car-engine filter to the generator.
We had wood-fired coffee next to the rubble of my friend's family's former homes – all levelled during Israel's three-week war on Gaza that started one year ago. His only source of income, a taxi, was crushed by Israeli tanks during the assault. He agonises about how his children no longer respect him as their father. He is unable to provide them with the security of a house and an independent family life; they lost everything.
The family is spread around relatives' homes. But the family's old man just moved into a 60sq m house built from mud and brick, standing next to the rubble of his 400sq m three-story house for which he saved for a lifetime. It was one of the first the UN Relief and Works Agency built after having seemingly lost hope in any Israeli intention to allow construction materials into Gaza. My friend's daughter earns the highest grades in her class and is eyeing a scholarship for one of the universities in Gaza when she leaves high school. But this young woman's resilience and motivation will go nowhere as long as Gaza is blockaded.
Almost nothing has been more deceitful than casting Gaza as a humanitarian case. This is becoming exponentially more problematic a year after the war. Gaza urgently needs far more than merely those items judged by the Israeli military as adequate to satisfy Gaza's humanitarian needs. This list of allowable items is tiny compared to people's needs for a minimally respectable civil life.
Gaza is not treated humanely; the immediate concerns about the situation have clearly given way to long-term complacency, while failed politics has now become stagnant. The humanitarian classification conceals the urgent need to address this. Moreover, many in the international community have conveniently resorted to blaming Palestinians for their political divisions, as though they were unrelated to Israel's policies – most notably Gaza's closure after Israeli disengagement in 2005.
It seems evident that most officials in the US, UK and other powerful nations in Europe and the Middle East do not – or perhaps cannot – pressure Israel to reverse its policy of forcing Palestinians into eternal statelessness. How Palestinians are forced into degrading living standards in Gaza, and how they have no means to repel the ongoing demolition and confiscation of property and land in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, is abhorrent. How Palestinians are still divided despite the increased suffering of their people is no less abhorrent. However, no one should fool themselves into believing that their reconciliation would alter Israel's policy.
The international community must surely adopt a new approach – where it would not be seen as acquiescent to Israel's policies. If the current policy continues then, at least, let it not be at the expense of Palestinian self-respect. Palestinians are a dignified people, as competitive and civilised as any other people in the world. It is far too humiliating for Palestinians to endure not only being occupied but to be made beggars
For years it has been impossible not to suspect that Israel does not want peace. Of late, the US-backed state has consistently created impossible conditions for fair and equal negotiations with the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, and it continues to undermine moderate voices and drive people towards extremism in Gaza. The fact that Palestinians still genuinely want peace should not allow Israel to reject the simplest rules of civility. The US and the EU should come to Gaza; then they could draw their own conclusions on an Israeli policy they have backed and funded without ever witnessing its consequences on ordinary civilians' lives. Surely then they could not fail to see that changing their policy is a moral imperative.
This is not humane. We need dignity
A year on from Operation Cast Lead, the Gaza blockade is preventing people from leading a minimally respectable civil life
Sami Abdel-Shafi
The Guardian, Tuesday 29 December 2009
Article history
On my way to visit a friend in the Abed Rabbo district, north of the Gaza Strip, the taxi driver handed me a small pack of biscuits for change. There are nearly no copper coins left here so cab drivers barter a half Israeli shekel for biscuits brought in from the tunnels between the southern city of Rafah and Egypt's northern Sinai. Some Gazans, who once earned a respectable living, resorted to melting coins and sold the copper for food supplies.
This was not the first time I was forced into arcane methods of barter. A few weeks ago I was told that oil filters for our British-made electricity generator could only be brought in through the tunnels. One alternative was to fit a refurbished car-engine filter to the generator.
We had wood-fired coffee next to the rubble of my friend's family's former homes – all levelled during Israel's three-week war on Gaza that started one year ago. His only source of income, a taxi, was crushed by Israeli tanks during the assault. He agonises about how his children no longer respect him as their father. He is unable to provide them with the security of a house and an independent family life; they lost everything.
The family is spread around relatives' homes. But the family's old man just moved into a 60sq m house built from mud and brick, standing next to the rubble of his 400sq m three-story house for which he saved for a lifetime. It was one of the first the UN Relief and Works Agency built after having seemingly lost hope in any Israeli intention to allow construction materials into Gaza. My friend's daughter earns the highest grades in her class and is eyeing a scholarship for one of the universities in Gaza when she leaves high school. But this young woman's resilience and motivation will go nowhere as long as Gaza is blockaded.
Almost nothing has been more deceitful than casting Gaza as a humanitarian case. This is becoming exponentially more problematic a year after the war. Gaza urgently needs far more than merely those items judged by the Israeli military as adequate to satisfy Gaza's humanitarian needs. This list of allowable items is tiny compared to people's needs for a minimally respectable civil life.
Gaza is not treated humanely; the immediate concerns about the situation have clearly given way to long-term complacency, while failed politics has now become stagnant. The humanitarian classification conceals the urgent need to address this. Moreover, many in the international community have conveniently resorted to blaming Palestinians for their political divisions, as though they were unrelated to Israel's policies – most notably Gaza's closure after Israeli disengagement in 2005.
It seems evident that most officials in the US, UK and other powerful nations in Europe and the Middle East do not – or perhaps cannot – pressure Israel to reverse its policy of forcing Palestinians into eternal statelessness. How Palestinians are forced into degrading living standards in Gaza, and how they have no means to repel the ongoing demolition and confiscation of property and land in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, is abhorrent. How Palestinians are still divided despite the increased suffering of their people is no less abhorrent. However, no one should fool themselves into believing that their reconciliation would alter Israel's policy.
The international community must surely adopt a new approach – where it would not be seen as acquiescent to Israel's policies. If the current policy continues then, at least, let it not be at the expense of Palestinian self-respect. Palestinians are a dignified people, as competitive and civilised as any other people in the world. It is far too humiliating for Palestinians to endure not only being occupied but to be made beggars
For years it has been impossible not to suspect that Israel does not want peace. Of late, the US-backed state has consistently created impossible conditions for fair and equal negotiations with the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, and it continues to undermine moderate voices and drive people towards extremism in Gaza. The fact that Palestinians still genuinely want peace should not allow Israel to reject the simplest rules of civility. The US and the EU should come to Gaza; then they could draw their own conclusions on an Israeli policy they have backed and funded without ever witnessing its consequences on ordinary civilians' lives. Surely then they could not fail to see that changing their policy is a moral imperative.
Negotiations underway to release Gilad Shalit
This note came in today from the Conservative Friends of Israel. If the Shalit / Barghouti deal goes through, it signals the beginning of hope for a peace process:
· Israel and Hamas are currently trying to broker a deal that would end the three and a half year captivity of captured Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit.
· Details came to light on Sunday 22 November when Israeli President, Shimon Peres, signalled signs of movement in the stalled negotiations of Shalit’s release, stating that ‘real progress has been made…but the details must be kept behind the scenes’.
· Following this statement, Hamas sources confirmed that a deal could be sealed within days.
· It is thought that the deal will involve exchanging Shalit for hundreds of Palestinian prisoners.
· According to a Palestinian source, Israel will release a total of 1,150 Palestinian prisoners in the deal, which is due to take place in three stages.
· The first exchange will require 450 terrorists to be freed, after which Shalit will be transferred to Egypt.
· Israel will then release the rest of the prisoners in two stages, after which Shalit will be brought to Israel.
· The Palestinian source has also stated the Egyptian mediators are seeking to complete the deal as a comprehensive package in which Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, will also be involved.
· The mediators want Abbas’ Fatah movement to reach a reconciliation agreement with Hamas which would include the announcement of a truce with Israel, and the opening of the Gaza Strip’s border crossings where Palestinian Authority policemen would be deployed.
· It is thought that the prisoner exchange will take place next week after the Muslim holiday of Id al-Adha, which ends on Monday.
· Amongst the Palestinian prisoners rumoured to be released is Fatah activist Marwan Barghouti, who is currently serving five life sentences in Israel for his role in a series of deadly terrorist attacks during the second intifadah.
· If Barghouti is released it could have far-reaching strategic implications on the internal Palestinian balance of power and attempts to strike a peace deal with Israel, as it is thought that he will run for President in the Palestinian elections.
· For several years the two main Palestinian factions – Fatah and Hamas – have been deadlocked in fierce rivalry that has led to the division of the Fatah-controlled West Bank from the Gaza Strip violently seized by Hamas in June 2007.
· However, the release of Barghouti may mark a turning point in the relations between the two factions if he succeeds Mahmoud Abbas as the head of Fatah and perhaps as Palestinian president.
· In recent days, Barghouti has been explicit in his support for Palestinian unity between rival factions, noting that this is the single most important challenge facing the Palestinian leadership.
· In addition, the exchange will considerably complicate attempts to re-start peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, as the prisoner release is being attributed to Hamas.
· Undoubtedly, Hamas will use the Shalit deal to re-shape the Palestinian internal balance of power by claiming that they brought Israel to its knees.
· The release of prisoners held in Israeli jails is a pivotal and symbolic part of Palestinian discourse across the political spectrum. Hamas will seek to portray a deal as a vindication of its path of violent resistance and terror.
· If they succeed in including Barghouti in the prisoner release, Hamas will hope to improve their image as a party acting for the greater Palestinian national interest.
· In seeking to abate the negative effects on Abbas, Israel has announced a 10 month settlement freeze on construction in the West Bank and pardoned terrorists, so as to immediately resume stalled peace talks.
· It is likely that further steps will be forthcoming in an effort to persuade Abbas to re-enter negotiations.
· It is also rumoured that Ahmad Sadat, a leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Ibrahim Hamed, the former commander of Hamas’ military wing and the mastermind behind the 2002 terror bombing at the Moment café in Jerusalem, will be released as part of the prisoner exchange.
· Israel and Hamas are currently trying to broker a deal that would end the three and a half year captivity of captured Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit.
· Details came to light on Sunday 22 November when Israeli President, Shimon Peres, signalled signs of movement in the stalled negotiations of Shalit’s release, stating that ‘real progress has been made…but the details must be kept behind the scenes’.
· Following this statement, Hamas sources confirmed that a deal could be sealed within days.
· It is thought that the deal will involve exchanging Shalit for hundreds of Palestinian prisoners.
· According to a Palestinian source, Israel will release a total of 1,150 Palestinian prisoners in the deal, which is due to take place in three stages.
· The first exchange will require 450 terrorists to be freed, after which Shalit will be transferred to Egypt.
· Israel will then release the rest of the prisoners in two stages, after which Shalit will be brought to Israel.
· The Palestinian source has also stated the Egyptian mediators are seeking to complete the deal as a comprehensive package in which Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, will also be involved.
· The mediators want Abbas’ Fatah movement to reach a reconciliation agreement with Hamas which would include the announcement of a truce with Israel, and the opening of the Gaza Strip’s border crossings where Palestinian Authority policemen would be deployed.
· It is thought that the prisoner exchange will take place next week after the Muslim holiday of Id al-Adha, which ends on Monday.
· Amongst the Palestinian prisoners rumoured to be released is Fatah activist Marwan Barghouti, who is currently serving five life sentences in Israel for his role in a series of deadly terrorist attacks during the second intifadah.
· If Barghouti is released it could have far-reaching strategic implications on the internal Palestinian balance of power and attempts to strike a peace deal with Israel, as it is thought that he will run for President in the Palestinian elections.
· For several years the two main Palestinian factions – Fatah and Hamas – have been deadlocked in fierce rivalry that has led to the division of the Fatah-controlled West Bank from the Gaza Strip violently seized by Hamas in June 2007.
· However, the release of Barghouti may mark a turning point in the relations between the two factions if he succeeds Mahmoud Abbas as the head of Fatah and perhaps as Palestinian president.
· In recent days, Barghouti has been explicit in his support for Palestinian unity between rival factions, noting that this is the single most important challenge facing the Palestinian leadership.
· In addition, the exchange will considerably complicate attempts to re-start peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, as the prisoner release is being attributed to Hamas.
· Undoubtedly, Hamas will use the Shalit deal to re-shape the Palestinian internal balance of power by claiming that they brought Israel to its knees.
· The release of prisoners held in Israeli jails is a pivotal and symbolic part of Palestinian discourse across the political spectrum. Hamas will seek to portray a deal as a vindication of its path of violent resistance and terror.
· If they succeed in including Barghouti in the prisoner release, Hamas will hope to improve their image as a party acting for the greater Palestinian national interest.
· In seeking to abate the negative effects on Abbas, Israel has announced a 10 month settlement freeze on construction in the West Bank and pardoned terrorists, so as to immediately resume stalled peace talks.
· It is likely that further steps will be forthcoming in an effort to persuade Abbas to re-enter negotiations.
· It is also rumoured that Ahmad Sadat, a leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Ibrahim Hamed, the former commander of Hamas’ military wing and the mastermind behind the 2002 terror bombing at the Moment café in Jerusalem, will be released as part of the prisoner exchange.