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The Israeli Iron Dome
Israel’s Iron Dome, also known as the ‘Iron Cap’, is a mobile air defence system designed to protect populated areas across the country. After several yearsof development, the Iron Dome came online in early 2011 and has been criticised for its maintenance cost. The system was built by the Israeli company, Rafael Advanced Defence Systems, and was largely funded by the United States. In total, the US has set aside more than $200 million dollars to help Israel pay for the system, but financial concerns remain. There was haste to get system in to service to defend against Palestinian missile threats, particularly from the Quassam rocket type. The Israeli military have continuously praised the Iron Dome for its effectiveness during the current predicamentwith Gaza.
Questions have arisen about the operational effectiveness of the Iron Dome. According to Israeli officials, some 84% of targets engaged during the 2012 conflict in Gaza were hit. Nevertheless, it has been suggested by Professor Theodore Postol of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), that the success rate of the defence system may have been “drastically lower". Mordechai Scheffer, who previously worked for the RAFAEL Armament Development Authority, emphasised that the IDF’s claim of an 84% success rate was optimistic, placing the true success rate as low as 5-10%. In addition to this, Dr Reuven Pedatzur,noted military analyst and a professor at Tel Aviv University, argued that an atomic bomb can be an immediate danger to Israel’s survival, and as there is no guarantee that the system will work, the system in itself is useless. While the Iron Dome has probably prevented a large ground operation against Israel, questions remain about the implications of the system for the Middle East Peace Process.
The biggest issue with the Iron Dome is the clear division between Israel and the Arab states which surround it (including the occupied Palestinian Territories). It is believed by some to be instrumental in the peace process, and in the view of the Israeli Ambassador to the United States, Michael Oren, “It gave us space and time”. The differentiation however fuels further separation and could be seen as a catalyst for an arms race, as it could encourage neighbouring countries to acquire larger quantities of missiles and rockets to penetrate the defensive cover.
The possibility of fuelling a further conflict maybe one thing Israel is willing to do in order to protect itself. The Iron Dome is the first part of a multi-layered defence strategy. The second, David’s Sling or the Magic Wand, is designed to target medium - to long-range rockets and cruise missiles. The joint US-Israel missile interception systems, such as Arrow 2 (operational) and Arrow 3 (in development) suggest there could be even more aggravation within the region. The Iron Dome could create the impression that Israel is prepared to tolerate enemy attacks to a degree. Moreover, these systems, including the Iron Dome, have the potential to tie Israel’s hands and could undermine trust in the country’s traditionally offensive approach.
All things considered, the lack of casualties among Israeli civilians could make any large-scale domestic or external military retaliation almost invalid. However, the Iron Dome does have weaknesses, one of them being unable to defend communities located in close proximity to the border of the Gaza strip. This problem poses a huge issue for the authenticity of the Iron Dome, as if it cannot protect the nation of Israel, what is the point of it being in existence? In a nutshell, Israel’s Iron Dome has the potential to promote differentiation and further fragmentation of the Middle East Peace Process.
A step in the right direction?
17 Bahrainis were sentenced to 15 years imprisonment on 17th March, for the attempted murder of 4 police officers last year by planting an incendiary device at a roadblock. The attack which took place last April involved a homemade bomb planted in a roadblock made with tyres, palm tree trunks and garbage bin. The device went off as the officers approached the roadblock in their vehicle. The officers sustained injuries as a result of the explosion.
This news came following the appointment of the Crown Prince of Bahrain was as the new deputy Prime Minister. Previously shunned aside for being a moderate, his appointment has raised hopes of a resolution to end over 2 years of unrest in Bahrain.
This will place the Crown Prince in a position that will aid efforts of finally resolving years of discord between the Sunni royal family and the majority Shia population.
According to Khalil al-Marzook, a senior member of the leading opposition al-Wefaq society, “The challenge (for the Crown Prince) will be to leverage this senior role. Now that he is in the government, we should see his reform agenda in practice rather than in words.”
Sources close to the moderate faction in the ruling family claim that the Crown Prince is the “only one that has appeal to everyone. He listens, he takes criticism...”
His appointment is Bahrain’s way of showing that Bahrain is making efforts to move forward on reforms however, the results remain to be seen.
This news came following the appointment of the Crown Prince of Bahrain was as the new deputy Prime Minister. Previously shunned aside for being a moderate, his appointment has raised hopes of a resolution to end over 2 years of unrest in Bahrain.
This will place the Crown Prince in a position that will aid efforts of finally resolving years of discord between the Sunni royal family and the majority Shia population.
According to Khalil al-Marzook, a senior member of the leading opposition al-Wefaq society, “The challenge (for the Crown Prince) will be to leverage this senior role. Now that he is in the government, we should see his reform agenda in practice rather than in words.”
Sources close to the moderate faction in the ruling family claim that the Crown Prince is the “only one that has appeal to everyone. He listens, he takes criticism...”
His appointment is Bahrain’s way of showing that Bahrain is making efforts to move forward on reforms however, the results remain to be seen.
Breakdown of Monthly Casualty Figures for Syria
July 2012 to February 2013
Monthly Casualties
Detailed Weekly FiguresFor the civilian casualty figures NCF used the LCC figure subtracting the highest rebel casualty figure per area CASUALTIES FOR JULY CIVILIANS REBELS GOVERNMENT 01.07.12 58 10 19 WEEK 2.07-8.07 462 70 191 WEEK 9.07-15.07 454 170 237 WEEK 16.07-22.07 848 211 348 WEEK 23.07-29.07 829 199 228 30.07.12 97 26 34 31.07.12 41 47 62 TOTAL 2789 733 1119 For the civilian casualty figures NCF used the LCC figure subtracting the highest rebel casualty figure per area. The figures for the last two weeks are taken from VDC. CASUALTIES FOR AUGUST CIVILIANS REBELS GOVERNMENT WEEK 01.08-05.08 435 278 201 WEEK 06.08-12.08 469 598 309 WEEK 13.08-19.08 766 373 269 WEEK 20.08-26.08 1287 309 272 WEEK 27.08-31.08 611 216 127 TOTAL 3568 1774 1178 NCF has chosen the highest available figures for each day and area. CASUALTIES FOR SEPTEMBER CIVILIANS REBELS GOVERNMENT 01.09.2012 256 58 32 02.09.2012 158 13 N/A WEEK 03.09-09.09 1534 233 261 WEEK 10.09-16.09 1206 321 198 WEEK 17.09-23.09 1232 465 205 WEEK 24.09-30.09 1497 606 172 TOTAL 5883 1696 868 NCF has chosen the highest available figures for each day and area. CASUALTIES FOR OCTOBER CIVILIANS REBELS GOVERNMENT WEEK 01.10-07.10 1158 660 353 WEEK 08.10-14.10 1484 851 411 WEEK 15.10-21.10 1242 787 363 WEEK 22.10-28.10 1202 339 272 WEEK 29.10-31.10 451 99 217 TOTAL 5537 2736 1616 NCF has chosen the highest available figures for each day and area. CASUALTIES FOR NOVEMBER CIVILIANS REBELS GOVERNMENT WEEK 01.11-04.11 750 209 231 WEEK 05.11-11.11 1064 412 326 WEEK 12.11-18.11 1093 288 322 WEEK 19.11-25.11 937 786 295 WEEK 26.11-30.11 794 232 317 TOTAL 4638 1927 1491
For the civilian figures, NCF subtracted the highest daily rebel estimates from Syrian Shuhada’s daily overall figures. For the rebels and government figures, NCF has chosen the highest available figures for each day and area. CASUALTIES FOR DECEMBER CIVILIANS REBELS GOVERNMENT 01.12.2012 102 74 35 02.12.2012 152 29 41 WEEK 03.12-09.12 486 238 268 WEEK 10.12-16.12 684 343 326 WEEK 17.12-23.12 481 557 360 WEEK 24.12-30.12 616 338 377 31.12.2012 51 100 50 TOTAL 2572 1679 1457
For the civilian figures, NCF subtracted the highest daily rebel estimates from Syrian Shuhada’s daily overall figures. For the rebels* and government figures, NCF has chosen the highest available figures for each day and area. CASUALTIES FOR JANUARY CIVILIANS REBELS GOVERNMENT 01.01 – 06.01.2013 511 471 263 WEEK 07.01 – 13.01 384 309 182 WEEK 14.01 – 20.01 752 438 285 WEEK 21.01 – 27.01 439 454 300 28.01 – 31.01.2013 437 224 182 TOTAL 2523 1896 1212
For the civilian figures, NCF subtracted the highest daily rebel estimates from Syrian Shuhada’s daily overall figures. For the rebels* and government figures, NCF has chosen the highest available figures for each day and area. CASUALTIES FOR FEBRUARY CIVILIANS REBELS GOVERNMENT WEEK 01.02-03.02 157 215 148 WEEK 04.02-10.02 580 389 319 WEEK 11.02-17.02 549 398 422 WEEK 18.02-24.02 861 302 289 WEEK 25.02-28.02 353 223 194 TOTAL 2500 1527 1372
*From January 2013, all SANA rebel casualty figures will be capped at a 100% of the highest total available for the day. More detailed analysis of casualty figures can be found on the Syria Blog.
Monthly Casualties
Detailed Weekly FiguresFor the civilian casualty figures NCF used the LCC figure subtracting the highest rebel casualty figure per area CASUALTIES FOR JULY CIVILIANS REBELS GOVERNMENT 01.07.12 58 10 19 WEEK 2.07-8.07 462 70 191 WEEK 9.07-15.07 454 170 237 WEEK 16.07-22.07 848 211 348 WEEK 23.07-29.07 829 199 228 30.07.12 97 26 34 31.07.12 41 47 62 TOTAL 2789 733 1119 For the civilian casualty figures NCF used the LCC figure subtracting the highest rebel casualty figure per area. The figures for the last two weeks are taken from VDC. CASUALTIES FOR AUGUST CIVILIANS REBELS GOVERNMENT WEEK 01.08-05.08 435 278 201 WEEK 06.08-12.08 469 598 309 WEEK 13.08-19.08 766 373 269 WEEK 20.08-26.08 1287 309 272 WEEK 27.08-31.08 611 216 127 TOTAL 3568 1774 1178 NCF has chosen the highest available figures for each day and area. CASUALTIES FOR SEPTEMBER CIVILIANS REBELS GOVERNMENT 01.09.2012 256 58 32 02.09.2012 158 13 N/A WEEK 03.09-09.09 1534 233 261 WEEK 10.09-16.09 1206 321 198 WEEK 17.09-23.09 1232 465 205 WEEK 24.09-30.09 1497 606 172 TOTAL 5883 1696 868 NCF has chosen the highest available figures for each day and area. CASUALTIES FOR OCTOBER CIVILIANS REBELS GOVERNMENT WEEK 01.10-07.10 1158 660 353 WEEK 08.10-14.10 1484 851 411 WEEK 15.10-21.10 1242 787 363 WEEK 22.10-28.10 1202 339 272 WEEK 29.10-31.10 451 99 217 TOTAL 5537 2736 1616 NCF has chosen the highest available figures for each day and area. CASUALTIES FOR NOVEMBER CIVILIANS REBELS GOVERNMENT WEEK 01.11-04.11 750 209 231 WEEK 05.11-11.11 1064 412 326 WEEK 12.11-18.11 1093 288 322 WEEK 19.11-25.11 937 786 295 WEEK 26.11-30.11 794 232 317 TOTAL 4638 1927 1491
For the civilian figures, NCF subtracted the highest daily rebel estimates from Syrian Shuhada’s daily overall figures. For the rebels and government figures, NCF has chosen the highest available figures for each day and area. CASUALTIES FOR DECEMBER CIVILIANS REBELS GOVERNMENT 01.12.2012 102 74 35 02.12.2012 152 29 41 WEEK 03.12-09.12 486 238 268 WEEK 10.12-16.12 684 343 326 WEEK 17.12-23.12 481 557 360 WEEK 24.12-30.12 616 338 377 31.12.2012 51 100 50 TOTAL 2572 1679 1457
For the civilian figures, NCF subtracted the highest daily rebel estimates from Syrian Shuhada’s daily overall figures. For the rebels* and government figures, NCF has chosen the highest available figures for each day and area. CASUALTIES FOR JANUARY CIVILIANS REBELS GOVERNMENT 01.01 – 06.01.2013 511 471 263 WEEK 07.01 – 13.01 384 309 182 WEEK 14.01 – 20.01 752 438 285 WEEK 21.01 – 27.01 439 454 300 28.01 – 31.01.2013 437 224 182 TOTAL 2523 1896 1212
For the civilian figures, NCF subtracted the highest daily rebel estimates from Syrian Shuhada’s daily overall figures. For the rebels* and government figures, NCF has chosen the highest available figures for each day and area. CASUALTIES FOR FEBRUARY CIVILIANS REBELS GOVERNMENT WEEK 01.02-03.02 157 215 148 WEEK 04.02-10.02 580 389 319 WEEK 11.02-17.02 549 398 422 WEEK 18.02-24.02 861 302 289 WEEK 25.02-28.02 353 223 194 TOTAL 2500 1527 1372
*From January 2013, all SANA rebel casualty figures will be capped at a 100% of the highest total available for the day. More detailed analysis of casualty figures can be found on the Syria Blog.
BACKGROUND CASUALTY FIGURES
CASUALTY FIGURES - WEEK ENDING 24th FEBRUARY 2013
CIVILIAN CASUALTIESWe have counted unidentified bodies as civilian casualties and we have included them on the day the bodies have been found.
Mon 18SYRIAN OBSERVATORY FOR HUMAN RIGHTSVIOLATIONS DOCUMENTING CENTRESYRIAN ARAB NEWS AGENCYDAMASCUS CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTSLOCAL COORDINATION COMMITTEESSYRIAN SHUHADAHOMS27
10106DEIR EZZOR
1
8
1DAMASCUS PROVINCE322
283019DERA’A35
98
IDLIB44
12127ALEPPO155
202318HAMA
1
371LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ9
RAQQA
71HASAKEH
1
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL2295NA919753Tues 19
HOMS711
121116DEIR EZZOR11
231DAMASCUS PROVINCE758
646070DERA’A43
454IDLIB12
31413ALEPPO3418
545550HAMA42
553LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ40
RAQQA3
16
HASAKEH
2QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL10195NA145159159Wed 20
HOMS75
12129DEIR EZZOR21
33
DAMASCUS PROVINCE1482
9496105DERA’A1214
161614IDLIB1010
111110ALEPPO410
151912HAMA11
121LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ56
RAQQA
2
515HASAKEH11
1
1QUNEITRA
111TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL107126NA159161158Thu 21
HOMS
8
11117DEIR EZZOR
1
242DAMASCUS PROVINCE
75
118103124DERA’A
32
404040IDLIB
10
111212ALEPPO
38
313239HAMA
8
1065LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
22HASAKEH
1
QUNEITRA
1
2
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTALNA174NA225210231Fri 22
HOMS78
10178DEIR EZZOR22
785DAMASCUS PROVINCE1239
405438DERA’A1820
152121IDLIB
2
322ALEPPO35117
6290120HAMA11
461LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ16
RAQQA45
325HASAKEH
6
11106QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
1
11TOTAL95201NA155211207Sat 23
HOMS
141DEIR EZZOR
531DAMASCUS PROVINCE723
384025DERA’A
4
6
4IDLIB42
483ALEPPO5410
737412HAMA13
272LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ17
RAQQA48
267HASAKEH
1
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL8750NA13114355Sun 24
HOMS415
2621DEIR EZZOR12
11DAMASCUS PROVINCE1133
4038DERA’A63
64IDLIB87
188ALEPPO1610
3013HAMA22
182LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA31
11HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL5173NANA14088
REBEL CASUALTIES
Mon 18SYRIAN OBSERVATORY FOR HUMAN RIGHTSVIOLATIONS DOCUMENTING CENTRESYRIAN ARAB NEWS AGENCYDAMASCUS CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTSLOCAL COORDINATION COMMITTEESSYRIAN SHUHADAHOMS12
DEIR EZZOR77
DAMASCUS PROVINCE18
DERA’A34
IDLIB662
ALEPPO753
HAMA
1
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ5
1
RAQQA
21
HASAKEH
11
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL30368NANANATues 19
HOMS4519
DEIR EZZOR11
DAMASCUS PROVINCE45
DERA’A
IDLIB223
ALEPPO44
HAMA12
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ5
1
RAQQA2
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
31
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL232224NANANAWed 20
HOMS52
DEIR EZZOR31
DAMASCUS PROVINCE17
DERA’A33
IDLIB11
ALEPPO54
HAMA
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ24
RAQQA22
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL4420NANANANAThu 21
HOMS
64
DEIR EZZOR
4
DAMASCUS PROVINCE
73
DERA’A
9
IDLIB
21
ALEPPO
52
HAMA
42
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTALNA3712NANANAFri 22
HOMS11
DEIR EZZOR46
DAMASCUS PROVINCE17
DERA’A1
IDLIB1
ALEPPO22
HAMA
3
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ14
RAQQA
1
HASAKEH
4
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL2424NANANANASat 23
HOMS
DEIR EZZOR
DAMASCUS PROVINCE21610
DERA’A
2
IDLIB23
ALEPPO99
HAMA11
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ3
RAQQA
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL173110NANANASun 24
HOMS262
DEIR EZZOR
DAMASCUS PROVINCE
45
DERA’A
IDLIB1128
ALEPPO121710
HAMA14115
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL295030NANANA
GOVERNMENT CASUALTIES
Mon 18SYRIAN OBSERVATORY FOR HUMAN RIGHTSVIOLATIONS DOCUMENTING CENTRESYRIAN ARAB NEWS AGENCYDAMASCUS CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTSLOCAL COORDINATION COMMITTEESSYRIAN SHUHADAHOMS
2DEIR EZZOR
8DAMASCUS PROVINCE11
8DERA’A7
IDLIB4
5ALEPPO9
6HAMA
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
2HASAKEH
1QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL31NANANANA32Tues 19
HOMS2
6DEIR EZZOR3
1DAMASCUS PROVINCE4
5DERA’A5
IDLIB
2ALEPPO5
6HAMA
2LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
HASAKEH4
QUNEITRA
3TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL23NANANANA25Wed 20
HOMS4
2DEIR EZZOR4
2DAMASCUS PROVINCE12
7DERA’A6
3IDLIB7
1ALEPPO7
4HAMA
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
2HASAKEH8
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL48NANANANA21Thu 21
HOMS
6DEIR EZZOR
4DAMASCUS PROVINCE
7DERA’A
8IDLIB
4ALEPPO
5HAMA
1LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTALNANANANANA35Fri 22
HOMS2
1DEIR EZZOR7
5DAMASCUS PROVINCE8
7DERA’A3
IDLIB
ALEPPO8
2HAMA3
3LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
1HASAKEH6
4QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL37NANANANA23Sat 23
HOMS2
DEIR EZZOR
DAMASCUS PROVINCE6
15DERA’A4
2IDLIB5
1ALEPPO9
9HAMA1
1LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
HASAKEH2
3QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL29NANANANA31Sun 24
HOMS4
9DEIR EZZOR
DAMASCUS PROVINCE6
3DERA’A
1IDLIB4
11ALEPPO11
14HAMA
7LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA2
HASAKEH
1QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL27NANANANA46
CIVILIAN CASUALTIESWe have counted unidentified bodies as civilian casualties and we have included them on the day the bodies have been found.
Mon 18SYRIAN OBSERVATORY FOR HUMAN RIGHTSVIOLATIONS DOCUMENTING CENTRESYRIAN ARAB NEWS AGENCYDAMASCUS CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTSLOCAL COORDINATION COMMITTEESSYRIAN SHUHADAHOMS27
10106DEIR EZZOR
1
8
1DAMASCUS PROVINCE322
283019DERA’A35
98
IDLIB44
12127ALEPPO155
202318HAMA
1
371LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ9
RAQQA
71HASAKEH
1
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL2295NA919753Tues 19
HOMS711
121116DEIR EZZOR11
231DAMASCUS PROVINCE758
646070DERA’A43
454IDLIB12
31413ALEPPO3418
545550HAMA42
553LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ40
RAQQA3
16
HASAKEH
2QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL10195NA145159159Wed 20
HOMS75
12129DEIR EZZOR21
33
DAMASCUS PROVINCE1482
9496105DERA’A1214
161614IDLIB1010
111110ALEPPO410
151912HAMA11
121LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ56
RAQQA
2
515HASAKEH11
1
1QUNEITRA
111TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL107126NA159161158Thu 21
HOMS
8
11117DEIR EZZOR
1
242DAMASCUS PROVINCE
75
118103124DERA’A
32
404040IDLIB
10
111212ALEPPO
38
313239HAMA
8
1065LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
22HASAKEH
1
QUNEITRA
1
2
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTALNA174NA225210231Fri 22
HOMS78
10178DEIR EZZOR22
785DAMASCUS PROVINCE1239
405438DERA’A1820
152121IDLIB
2
322ALEPPO35117
6290120HAMA11
461LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ16
RAQQA45
325HASAKEH
6
11106QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
1
11TOTAL95201NA155211207Sat 23
HOMS
141DEIR EZZOR
531DAMASCUS PROVINCE723
384025DERA’A
4
6
4IDLIB42
483ALEPPO5410
737412HAMA13
272LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ17
RAQQA48
267HASAKEH
1
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL8750NA13114355Sun 24
HOMS415
2621DEIR EZZOR12
11DAMASCUS PROVINCE1133
4038DERA’A63
64IDLIB87
188ALEPPO1610
3013HAMA22
182LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA31
11HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL5173NANA14088
REBEL CASUALTIES
Mon 18SYRIAN OBSERVATORY FOR HUMAN RIGHTSVIOLATIONS DOCUMENTING CENTRESYRIAN ARAB NEWS AGENCYDAMASCUS CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTSLOCAL COORDINATION COMMITTEESSYRIAN SHUHADAHOMS12
DEIR EZZOR77
DAMASCUS PROVINCE18
DERA’A34
IDLIB662
ALEPPO753
HAMA
1
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ5
1
RAQQA
21
HASAKEH
11
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL30368NANANATues 19
HOMS4519
DEIR EZZOR11
DAMASCUS PROVINCE45
DERA’A
IDLIB223
ALEPPO44
HAMA12
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ5
1
RAQQA2
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
31
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL232224NANANAWed 20
HOMS52
DEIR EZZOR31
DAMASCUS PROVINCE17
DERA’A33
IDLIB11
ALEPPO54
HAMA
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ24
RAQQA22
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL4420NANANANAThu 21
HOMS
64
DEIR EZZOR
4
DAMASCUS PROVINCE
73
DERA’A
9
IDLIB
21
ALEPPO
52
HAMA
42
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTALNA3712NANANAFri 22
HOMS11
DEIR EZZOR46
DAMASCUS PROVINCE17
DERA’A1
IDLIB1
ALEPPO22
HAMA
3
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ14
RAQQA
1
HASAKEH
4
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL2424NANANANASat 23
HOMS
DEIR EZZOR
DAMASCUS PROVINCE21610
DERA’A
2
IDLIB23
ALEPPO99
HAMA11
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ3
RAQQA
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL173110NANANASun 24
HOMS262
DEIR EZZOR
DAMASCUS PROVINCE
45
DERA’A
IDLIB1128
ALEPPO121710
HAMA14115
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL295030NANANA
GOVERNMENT CASUALTIES
Mon 18SYRIAN OBSERVATORY FOR HUMAN RIGHTSVIOLATIONS DOCUMENTING CENTRESYRIAN ARAB NEWS AGENCYDAMASCUS CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTSLOCAL COORDINATION COMMITTEESSYRIAN SHUHADAHOMS
2DEIR EZZOR
8DAMASCUS PROVINCE11
8DERA’A7
IDLIB4
5ALEPPO9
6HAMA
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
2HASAKEH
1QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL31NANANANA32Tues 19
HOMS2
6DEIR EZZOR3
1DAMASCUS PROVINCE4
5DERA’A5
IDLIB
2ALEPPO5
6HAMA
2LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
HASAKEH4
QUNEITRA
3TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL23NANANANA25Wed 20
HOMS4
2DEIR EZZOR4
2DAMASCUS PROVINCE12
7DERA’A6
3IDLIB7
1ALEPPO7
4HAMA
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
2HASAKEH8
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL48NANANANA21Thu 21
HOMS
6DEIR EZZOR
4DAMASCUS PROVINCE
7DERA’A
8IDLIB
4ALEPPO
5HAMA
1LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTALNANANANANA35Fri 22
HOMS2
1DEIR EZZOR7
5DAMASCUS PROVINCE8
7DERA’A3
IDLIB
ALEPPO8
2HAMA3
3LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
1HASAKEH6
4QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL37NANANANA23Sat 23
HOMS2
DEIR EZZOR
DAMASCUS PROVINCE6
15DERA’A4
2IDLIB5
1ALEPPO9
9HAMA1
1LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
HASAKEH2
3QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL29NANANANA31Sun 24
HOMS4
9DEIR EZZOR
DAMASCUS PROVINCE6
3DERA’A
1IDLIB4
11ALEPPO11
14HAMA
7LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA2
HASAKEH
1QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL27NANANANA46
BACKGROUND CASUALTY FIGURES
CASUALTY FIGURES - WEEK ENDING 17th FEBRUARY 2013
CIVILIAN CASUALTIESWe have counted unidentified bodies as civilian casualties and we have included them on the day the bodies have been found.
Mon 11SYRIAN OBSERVATORY FOR HUMAN RIGHTSVIOLATIONS DOCUMENTING CENTRESYRIAN ARAB NEWS AGENCYDAMASCUS CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTSLOCAL COORDINATION COMMITTEESSYRIAN SHUHADAHOMS915
9109DEIR EZZOR
8
753DAMASCUS PROVINCE522
303329DERA’A76
688IDLIB106
81018ALEPPO1923
394120HAMA12
221LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ10
RAQQA
1
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL6182NA10210988Tues 12
HOMS78
16209DEIR EZZOR
1
12115DAMASCUS PROVINCE332
304736DERA’A42
13149IDLIB
1
115ALEPPO116
30329HAMA52
792LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ21
RAQQA
11
10HASAKEH
122QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL4162NA12113687Wed 13
HOMS1014
181625DEIR EZZOR56
12193DAMASCUS PROVINCE1623
273733DERA’A1113
191415IDLIB1921
332821ALEPPO1522
485535HAMA510
71112LATAKIA
14
REEF DIMASQ3
RAQQA21
41415HASAKEH
4
213QUNEITRA
2
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL86114NA173199162Thu 14
HOMS109
151716DEIR EZZOR
2
8173DAMASCUS PROVINCE216
313321DERA’A35
24254IDLIB27
777ALEPPO268
204611HAMA15
665LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ8
RAQQA
1
112HASAKEH
4
24QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
1
1TOTAL5257NA11315474Fri 15
HOMS55
995DEIR EZZOR22
452DAMASCUS PROVINCE413
252918DERA’A
22
IDLIB1517
202018ALEPPO14
101214HAMA
2
LATAKIA
1
11
REEF DIMASQ5
RAQQA615
11515HASAKEH
44
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL3857NA868972Sat 16
HOMS711
182113DEIR EZZOR33
453DAMASCUS PROVINCE431
302335DERA’A25
445IDLIB16
11106ALEPPO312
232714HAMA27
987LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ6
RAQQA12
112HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
2
212TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL2979NA10210087Sun 17
HOMS24
354DEIR EZZOR11
10111DAMASCUS PROVINCE728
334637DERA’A
4
55
IDLIB24
444ALEPPO1616
242919HAMA56
14187LATAKIA1
1
REEF DIMASQ11
RAQQA
HASAKEH
1
1QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
2
SWAIDA
TOTAL4564NA9312173
REBEL CASUALTIES
Mon 11SYRIAN OBSERVATORY FOR HUMAN RIGHTSVIOLATIONS DOCUMENTING CENTRESYRIAN ARAB NEWS AGENCYDAMASCUS CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTSLOCAL COORDINATION COMMITTEESSYRIAN SHUHADAHOMS12
DEIR EZZOR6
DAMASCUS PROVINCE87
DERA’A
2
IDLIB11
ALEPPO1312
HAMA
1
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ10
RAQQA
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL3925NANANANATues 12
HOMS613
DEIR EZZOR10163
DAMASCUS PROVINCE
5
DERA’A9144
IDLIB
16
ALEPPO2421
HAMA11
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ2
RAQQA
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL527113NANANAWed 13
HOMS43
DEIR EZZOR67
DAMASCUS PROVINCE154
DERA’A543
IDLIB19142
ALEPPO182825
HAMA15
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ5
RAQQA2
HASAKEH13
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL626934NANANAThu 14
HOMS
1
DEIR EZZOR1012
DAMASCUS PROVINCE411
DERA’A1020
IDLIB1
ALEPPO78
HAMA
1
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ3
RAQQA
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
1
TOTAL3554NANANANAFri 15
HOMS
1
DEIR EZZOR15
DAMASCUS PROVINCE3107
DERA’A12
IDLIB
4
ALEPPO118
HAMA2
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ5
RAQQA
2
HASAKEH
1
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL23337NANANASat 16
HOMS811
DEIR EZZOR13
DAMASCUS PROVINCE35
DERA’A
IDLIB36
ALEPPO211
HAMA
3
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ2
RAQQA
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA1
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL2039NANANANASun 17
HOMS13
DEIR EZZOR109
DAMASCUS PROVINCE57
DERA’A6
IDLIB11
ALEPPO37
HAMA1111
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ5
RAQQA
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL4238NANANANA
GOVERNMENT CASUALTIES
Mon 11SYRIAN OBSERVATORY FOR HUMAN RIGHTSVIOLATIONS DOCUMENTING CENTRESYRIAN ARAB NEWS AGENCYDAMASCUS CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTSLOCAL COORDINATION COMMITTEESSYRIAN SHUHADAHOMS
DEIR EZZOR
3DAMASCUS PROVINCE
6DERA’A
IDLIB
1ALEPPO
12HAMA
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
1HASAKEH
3QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL43NANANANA26Tues 12
HOMS8
13DEIR EZZOR5
2DAMASCUS PROVINCE4
4DERA’A6
13IDLIB
ALEPPO50
19HAMA1
1LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA2
HASAKEH2
9QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL78NANANANA61Wed 13
HOMS5
2DEIR EZZOR
5DAMASCUS PROVINCE6
5DERA’A9
5IDLIB8
15ALEPPO16
21HAMA
4LATAKIA
1REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
2HASAKEH5
7QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL49NANANANA67Thu 14
HOMS
2DEIR EZZOR4
7DAMASCUS PROVINCE5
11DERA’A14
19IDLIB12
ALEPPO6
7HAMA
1LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
HASAKEH
5QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
1TOTAL41NANANANA53Fri 15
HOMS3
DEIR EZZOR1
4DAMASCUS PROVINCE7
11DERA’A3
1IDLIB4
4ALEPPO15
7HAMA
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
3HASAKEH
1QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL33NANANANA31Sat 16
HOMS5
11DEIR EZZOR
2DAMASCUS PROVINCE2
6DERA’A8
IDLIB2
4ALEPPO6
11HAMA2
1LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA3
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL28NANANANA35Sun 17
HOMS3
2DEIR EZZOR4
11DAMASCUS PROVINCE
8DERA’A9
6IDLIB2
ALEPPO8
4HAMA5
9LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
HASAKEH
1QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL31NANANANA41
BACKGROUND CASUALTY FIGURES
CASUALTY FIGURES - WEEK ENDING 10th FEBRUARY 2013
CIVILIAN CASUALTIESWe have counted unidentified bodies as civilian casualties and we have included them on the day the bodies have been found.
Mon 4SYRIAN OBSERVATORY FOR HUMAN RIGHTSVIOLATIONS DOCUMENTING CENTRESYRIAN ARAB NEWS AGENCYDAMASCUS CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTSLOCAL COORDINATION COMMITTEESSYRIAN SHUHADAHOMS18
11137DEIR EZZOR11
561DAMASCUS PROVINCE434
504151DERA’A812
91110IDLIB23
662ALEPPO1131
222319HAMA
3
663LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ11
RAQQA21
344HASAKEH
2
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL4093NA11411097Tues 5
HOMS35
445DEIR EZZOR
1
223DAMASCUS PROVINCE833
394141DERA’A76
1195IDLIB12
541ALEPPO148
424132HAMA11
331LATAKIA
11
REEF DIMASQ22
RAQQA
1
142HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
2
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL5657NA11010990Wed 6
HOMS513
12138DEIR EZZOR24
674DAMASCUS PROVINCE1939
577748DERA’A59
51511IDLIB
43
ALEPPO657
343019HAMA684
8848LATAKIA1
111REEF DIMASQ5
RAQQA
1
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
2
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
1
TOTAL49206NA129156139Thu 7
HOMS431
262833DEIR EZZOR
DAMASCUS PROVINCE1234
473350DERA’A34
663IDLIB19
11
9ALEPPO56
15145HAMA2310
1168
LATAKIA
1
1
REEF DIMASQ7
RAQQA
322HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
1
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
1
TOTAL5595NA122151102Fri 8
HOMS118
132112DEIR EZZOR
221DAMASCUS PROVINCE1728
354239DERA’A1313
151213IDLIB66
86ALEPPO1728
243228HAMA22
232LATAKIA
2
1REEF DIMASQ14
RAQQA
11HASAKEH
1
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL8085NA94121103Sat 9
HOMS810
17147DEIR EZZOR54
9123DAMASCUS PROVINCE1530
415746DERA’A55
12146IDLIB34
544ALEPPO2552
586048HAMA65
657LATAKIA
22
REEF DIMASQ16
RAQQA1
1
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
1
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL84110NA151169121Sun 10
HOMS35
794DEIR EZZOR
8
5242DAMASCUS PROVINCE1221
223827DERA’A9
10109IDLIB
2
44
ALEPPO1421
263322HAMA
15
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ9
RAQQA
1
111HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL4758NA7612465
REBEL CASUALTIES
Mon 4SYRIAN OBSERVATORY FOR HUMAN RIGHTSVIOLATIONS DOCUMENTING CENTRESYRIAN ARAB NEWS AGENCYDAMASCUS CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTSLOCAL COORDINATION COMMITTEESSYRIAN SHUHADAHOMS43
DEIR EZZOR
4
DAMASCUS PROVINCE
1113
DERA’A
IDLIB125
ALEPPO688
HAMA
2
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ16
RAQQA
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL273026NANANATues 5
HOMS342
DEIR EZZOR48
DAMASCUS PROVINCE182
DERA’A46
IDLIB152
ALEPPO1811
HAMA332
LATAKIA11
REEF DIMASQ8
RAQQA
1
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
1
TOTAL43488NANANAWed 6
HOMS97
DEIR EZZOR21
DAMASCUS PROVINCE1117
DERA’A33
IDLIB33
ALEPPO2222
HAMA11
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ22
RAQQA
1
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL7355NANANANAThu 7
HOMS24
DEIR EZZOR
DAMASCUS PROVINCE12213
DERA’A22
IDLIB254
ALEPPO711
HAMA1
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ9
RAQQA
1
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
1
TOTAL244617NANANAFri 8
HOMS67
DEIR EZZOR22
DAMASCUS PROVINCE39
DERA’A452
IDLIB122
ALEPPO24
HAMA
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ13
RAQQA
HASAKEH1
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL32294NANANASat 9
HOMS46
DEIR EZZOR883
DAMASCUS PROVINCE455
DERA’A77
IDLIB212
ALEPPO99
HAMA
2
LATAKIA
1
REEF DIMASQ8
RAQQA
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL423712NANANASun 10
HOMS32
DEIR EZZOR52
DAMASCUS PROVINCE17
DERA’A2
IDLIB23
ALEPPO1413
HAMA21
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ10
RAQQA11
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL4029NANANANA
GOVERNMENT CASUALTIES
Mon 4SYRIAN OBSERVATORY FOR HUMAN RIGHTSVIOLATIONS DOCUMENTING CENTRESYRIAN ARAB NEWS AGENCYDAMASCUS CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTSLOCAL COORDINATION COMMITTEESSYRIAN SHUHADAHOMS5
3DEIR EZZOR2
4DAMASCUS PROVINCE
14DERA’A
IDLIB3
1ALEPPO5
5HAMA
3LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ6
RAQQA3
1HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL24NANANANA31Tues 5
HOMS5
3DEIR EZZOR
2DAMASCUS PROVINCE7
6DERA’A3
6IDLIB
1ALEPPO8
12HAMA4
4LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
1HASAKEH
1QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL27NANANANA36Wed 6
HOMS20
12DEIR EZZOR
1DAMASCUS PROVINCE11
15DERA’A5
1IDLIB1
3ALEPPO9
21HAMA
1LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL46NANANANA54Thu 7
HOMS2
4DEIR EZZOR
DAMASCUS PROVINCE6
5DERA’A
2IDLIB3
4ALEPPO9
10HAMA4
9LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA3
1HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL27NANANANA35Fri 8
HOMS7
5DEIR EZZOR4
2DAMASCUS PROVINCE9
10DERA’A2
2IDLIB4
2ALEPPO17
2HAMA
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
1HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL43NANANANA24Sat 9
HOMS1
5DEIR EZZOR
10DAMASCUS PROVINCE6
6DERA’A1
5IDLIB3
1ALEPPO13
8HAMA
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA5
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL29NANANANA35Sun 10
HOMS3
2DEIR EZZOR4
8DAMASCUS PROVINCE7
7DERA’A2
2IDLIB
2ALEPPO9
9HAMA2
2LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA4
1HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL31NANANANA33
BAHRAIN REPORT
The following report was written by Samuel Morris on Bahrain and the Four Freedoms.
BAHRAIN AND THE FOUR FREEDOMS
The Kingdom of Bahrain is a nation cherished by many for its multicultural heritage and abundance of warm, hospitable people. The general perception is that the concept of democracy is a quintessential aspiration in a Middle Eastwhere democracy is the exception rather than the rule. However in the few instances in which democracy is given its head (e.g. the experiments in Algeria and Palestine) the results often seem unpalatable and are then undermined by an intolerant West. We would be the last to insist on the concept that Bahrainbecomes truly democratic. Nevertheless, if we are to preserve the Bahrain we know and have come to love, changes must be made to accommodate the aspirations of its people. Therefore this report will focus on those reforms that would transform Bahrain, making it more sustainable as a Kingdom and reduce levels of social turmoil which Bahrain has been subjected to for years.
While King Hamad Al Khalifa deserves credit for his decision to establish the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI), and for his prompt endorsement of its recommendations, it should be noted that some of the recommendations have not been fully implemented. It is also important to note that while the BICI report was a comprehensive investigation, it only covers a small period within a situation that continues week on week.
We believe that the full and speedy implementation of the recommendations published in the BICI report would go a long way towards easing the tension in Bahrain and restoring the trust desperately needed to push forward the processes of reconciliation and reform.
The NCF also believes that it would also be helpful to look at the situation in Bahrain under the heading of 'human security'.
The notion of ‘human security’ rather than ‘national security’ is one that is too often ignored. President Roosevelt’s four freedoms: Freedom of Religion, Freedom of Expression, Freedom from Want, and Freedom from Fear, serve as the basis of this concept of human security, and it is these four freedoms that this report focuses on in regard to Bahrain.
Our understandings of these freedoms, in relation to Bahrain, are as follow:
· Freedom of Speech and Expression: This goes beyond the freedom to talk and express oneself. It includes any act of seeking, receiving and conveying information, regardless of the medium used, which obviously includes the freedom of the press.
· Freedom of Religion: The freedom of every person to worship in his own way in equality with other religions and without persecution.
· Freedom from Want: Freedom from hunger and economic desperation, as individual freedom cannot truly exist without economic security.
· Freedom from Fear: Freedom to be able to live in an environment where you neither expect arrest without trial, nor to be the object of violent protest, nor of violent suppression of protest. An environment where you are free from the fear of persecution for your beliefs or views.
Between 2008 and 2010, Bahrainimproved its ranking in the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index by eight places. However, by 2011 it had slipped 22, ranking at 144 out of the 167 countries in the Index.
With general elections scheduled to be held in 2014, the government of the Kingdom of Bahrain should redouble efforts to reverse this decline through ongoing reforms in an attempt to make those elections a time for celebration rather than conflict.
The Next Century Foundation recommends that the 2014 elections be a target date for the government of Bahrain to address its internal issues. The expedient implementation of the findings of the BICI report would go a long way to ensuring this happens.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Article 22 of the Bahrain Constitution and legislative framework provides for the freedom of an individual to profess one’s faith. However, in practice limits have been placed on this freedom. Of a total population of 1,234,571, there are 866,888 Muslims and the rest are a mix of Christians, Hindus, Jews and Bahais.[1]These groups live and worship side-by-side, practicing their religion without interference from the government or other religious groups. However, the Shi’a community claim to be victims of systematic discrimination on religious grounds.
Bahraindoes not publish statistics on the sectarian breakdown of its citizens and Shi’ite population estimates vary greatly. Tensions between these two groups (Shi’a and Sunni) have resulted in socio-economic problems and limits being placed on the extent to which the Shi’a may participate in government.[2]These tensions came to the fore and, combined with other political, social and economic factors that cut across ethnic and sectarian lines, contributed to the uprisings on 14th February 2011.
The NCF proposes four initiatives to begin to tackle the continuing tensions:
1. Avoid defining the conflict along sectarian lines.
Most of those who participated in the uprisings over the past year have been from the Shi’a community. This has led many to the view that the conflict is sectarian. However, the conflict is not and has not been wholly sectarian. The protests cut across both religious and class divides; many problems exist outside the Shi’a-Sunni framework.
Government officials and Bahrainstate television have repeatedly blamed Iranfor inciting the popular unrest (Iran’s agenda being to strengthen Shi’a influence) but this is seen by the opposition as side-stepping and belittling the real issues. They view it is an indication that the government does not take their problems seriously. Although Bahrainmay legitimately feel threatened by Iranand its aspirations to establish ascendency in the region, it is dangerous for the Bahraingovernment, through state television, to point the finger elsewhere rather than address the issues within its own borders and amongst its own people. [3]
The government has made attempts to refrain from using the sectarian nationalist narrative that is frequently employed by opposition groups. However, instances have occurred. It is crucial that all media outlets, particularly those owned or controlled by the state, should abide by a strict code of conduct that would safeguard against involvement in spreading hatred or inciting violence. The Bahrain Journalists Association has adopted a new Code of Ethics as of 20 Jan 2012. It is important that this code is adhered to as it will encourage the promotion of the values of justice, equality, tolerance and peaceful coexistence. Moreover, it is the duty of the Government in any society to ensure the impartiality of state controlled media outlets and their accessibility to the opposition and to all sectors of the community. The Information Affairs Authority has received advice on how to achieve structural reform to enhance neutrality, pluralism, credibility, rule of law and national cohesion. It should act on that advice.
The main opposition bloc and the leading opposition party, al Wefaq, have often tried to avoid sectarian divisions, calling for Sunnis and Shiites alike to ‘wave the flag of democracy’. Even though al Wefaq is regarded as the moderate opposition, it must be recognised that there are extremist threads in the complicated and ever-shifting warp and weft of Bahrain’s political fabric. As the conflict has continued, more idealistic, hard-line voices have emerged who have taken advantage of increasing anger on the streets. This serves to emphasise the need for a quick political resolution of the issues that divide the people of Bahrain.
Another opposition faction that has attempted to avoid defining the conflict along sectarian lines is Wa'ad, a secular leftist party whose secretary-general Ebrahim Sharif has been in jail since April 2011. Wa'ad are not particularly popular - all the popular forces today are Islamists, as elsewhere - but they represent an important trend among intellectuals and business people. They have a strong track record of campaigning against sectarianism. Many Wa'ad politicians have married across the sectarian divide (including Ebrahim Sharif, whose wife is a secular Shi’a).
Ebrahim Sharif has always called for reform under a constitutional monarchy (as for that matter has Al Wefaq), and has been resolutely against violence. A growing section of the opposition has been calling for a republican option, as support for groups such as Al Wefaq declines. Large swathes of those protesting are best described as the “silent opposition”. These are individuals who are out on the street but are not affiliated with a political party and go under the “February 14” banner. Most opposition groups have to listen to these protestors or risk losing legitimacy.
Time is of the essence: the longer the resistance continues, the louder the extreme voices will become. The government of the Kingdom of Bahrainmust begin to strengthen the moderate, pragmatic groups among the opposition, and stop defining the conflict along sectarian lines. It must acknowledge the fact that there are some Sunnis in opposition to the government. If the conflict continues to increase its sectarian nature, moderates in the opposition are likely to be forced to choose sides, and invariably they will choose those the side they see as ‘their own’. The moderate opposition would then be lost.
2. Address the issue of citizenship within Bahrain.
The issue of citizenship has long been a contentious one. Less than half of Bahrain’s population are Bahraini citizens due to the influx of migrants and guest-workers. There have been accusations that the Bahraingovernment has practiced ethnic discrimination in regards to its policy of granting citizenship i.e. attempting to favour Sunni over Shi’a during the naturalization and citizenship processes. A Bahrainrepresentative has argued that these were unfounded allegations, and that between 2000-2010, as many as 11,000 Shi’as had gained citizenship[4], yet through calculations of the difference between the actual rate of growth of the number of citizens and the natural population growth rate since 2001 best estimates are that 60,000 foreigners have been granted citizenship during this period. The number of non-Shi’as being granted citizenship is therefore comparatively high.
3. Address the demolition of Shi’ite mosques and places of worship.
A number of Shi’ite places of worship have been demolished by the government since the 14th February protests. The government of the Kingdom of Bahrainhas not denied that these sites have been demolished, though it does dispute the motive behind them. The BICI Report set the number of demolished places at 30 and the government of Bahrainhas unconditionally accepted this. The government claims that these buildings were illegal and without the proper permits, but the timing and nature of the demolitions calls this into question. The BICI report acknowledges that only 5 out of 30 places of worship had requisite building permits while also stating, “the Commission notes with some concern the timing of demolition (1 March 2011 to 11 May 2011), which relates it to events of February and March. The Government of Bahrain must have been aware of the construction of these structures and that they lacked proper legal permits and did not conform to building regulations. Nonetheless, the Government of Bahrain had not stopped the construction of these structures nor taken action to remove them for a number of years. The Government should have realised that under the circumstances, in particular the timing, the manner in which demolitions were conducted and the fact that these were primarily Shia religious structures, the demolitions would be perceived as a collective punishment and would therefore inflame the tension between the Government of Bahrain and the Shia population.”[5]Fortunately, the Government suspended its action. However, the first week of December 2012 witnessed the removal of some Shi’a mosques that were being reconstructed. And during the Shi’a ceremony of Muharram in November 2012, the Interior Ministry jailed two Shia preachers and summoned scores for interrogation on the religious content of their speeches, something that has never happened before in Bahrain. There is no clear evidence that the Government intended to punish the citizens for their religious practises. However, the timing of such actions clearly helped to inflame the situation.
In an attempt to address this, on 22 May 2011, the King announced that new Shi’a places of worship would be built. The BICI report also recommended ‘a follow up on the King‘s statement to the effect that the Government of Bahrain will consider rebuilding, at its expense, some of the demolished religious structures in accordance with administrative regulations’. In section 1336, the Commission welcomes the Government of Bahrain addressing this question at the earliest possible time. A report by the Bahrain Centre of Human Rights, published on 26thMarch 2012, claims that rebuilding has begun on five mosques. The report also claims that when residents tried to rebuild the mosques themselves, they were prevented from doing so by the authorities, citing the example of the Ameer Mohammed Mosque, which has been rebuilt and demolished twice. The government of Bahrain claims that work has begun on 12 places at a total cost of US$26 million and that actual construction work has begun on five, while land has been fenced for the remaining seven on which construction work is to be phased in. It should be noted, however, that reconstruction has not necessarily taken place on the sites of the existing mosques. Some of these places of worship were on sites that have had religious significance (e.g. burial sites) for over 200 years and were built because of the religious significance of the site.
Although some of the building may have been without the proper permits and thus been deemed illegal, the demolition of Shi’ite places of worship is perceived by the Shi’a community as persecution and fuels both resentment and violent backlashes. It also further radicalises the opposition and diminishes their desire for dialogue. The issue of the sanctity of religious places is supremely sensitive, and by not working more quickly and with more dedication to reverse the damage done, the government will only foster greater division between itself and Bahrain’s Shi’a community.
4. Remove laws and conventions that deliberately prevent Shi’ites from gaining influence.
Although there have been great improvements in the openness of Bahrain’s politics, there are still areas which need improvement. There are several practises in Bahrain’s politics that deliberately prevent or restrict Shi’a participation in the governance of Bahrain, thus leaving them politically disenfranchised. In the 2010 elections, although Al Wefaq won only 18 out of the 40 of the seats in the Council of Deputies, they garnered a majority of the votes. Thus, despite gaining more than 50% of the votes, they only won 45% of the available seats.[6]
The geographic boundaries of constituencies in Bahrainare mapped out along ethnic lines to establish political advantage. The number of voters in each voting district varies greatly, from 12,000 to 500, which of course is seen as a deliberate attempt to restrict the number of seats Shi’ite political parties are likely to win. Because Bahrain in any case has a bicameral system with a government appointed by the King rather than by parliament, the manipulation of constituency size to this degree is unnecessary to guarantee the survival of the monarchy. The practice should be abandoned. The districting issue has been put on the negotiation table as part of the National Dialogue.
A further issue is that of election monitoring. Though observers from Bahrain’s non-governmental organisations, independent political and civil societies groups regularly monitor elections, international observers are barred. This is not to say that Bahrain’s election results should be called into question, but international election monitors should be allowed access to comply with international best practice. These issues should certainly be addressed before the 2014 elections.
5. Both the opposition and the government should make stronger commitment to dialogue
Having attained positions in parliament, opposition groups should utilise this key forum, particularly since a parliamentary majority could obtain a legislative veto.
Al Wefaq needs to find a credible way to re-engage in the parliamentary political process and the government needs to help facilitate this. To encourage Al Wefaq to re-engage serious concessions should be made by the government. Stepping back into the National Assembly without such concessions could be political suicide. If nothing is done and the situation continues to become more polarised, Al Wefaq may lose its popularity in the street and find itself pushed aside as hard-line opposition voices grow louder.
All opposition parties should also take part in the National Dialogue. If the National Dialogue meetings are to be successful and credible, the full spectrum of Bahrain’s political views should be present. To encourage opposition groups to a take part in such dialogue, bilateral meetings should also be organised to take place alongside the National Dialogue between the opposition (i.e. only the opposition not the pro-government parties) and the government. This would build confidence on the part of opposition groups and guarantee that their legitimate grievances are being heard. It should however be noted that a number of opposition members are in prison and therefore cannot attend any National Dialogue.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights[7]states that "everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice". Of course, total freedom of expression does not exist absolutely in any country, but freedom of expression remains an essential part of society, especially one as diverse as Bahrain. Suppression of the ideas and desires of any group in a society inevitably leads to the radicalisation of those who feel stifled. If they are not able to express themselves in words they will do so in actions.
The Government of Bahrain declared a three month state of emergency and banned protests to “maintain security” and safeguard “civil peace” in March 2011. The government claimed that demonstrators had threatened “national security” by calling for the overthrow of the government. Protests have now once again been banned,[8]this time just before the beginning of Muharram, which has effectively created a situation of Marshall Law.
The NCF recommends three initiatives:
1. Enforce constitutional protections guaranteeing freedom of expression and of the press.
Articles 23 and 24 of the constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrainguarantee freedom of expression, both in terms of opinion and the press. In order for the people of the Kingdom of Bahrain to have confidence in the integrity of the government and its promises, guarantees must be given. Any form of suppression of press freedom is counterproductive and therefore serves no useful purpose. Indeed, greater press freedom might act as a safety valve, actually reducing tension.
2. Address the treatment of opposition members.
Since February 14th, opposition members and activists have been imprisoned without trial and there have been reports of torture and death in custody. The ICRC has been in country since January 2012, freely visiting police stations, temporary detention facilities, jails and detainees. However restrictions have been placed on human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.
Though the government has agreed to retry key opposition leaders, many have not been released. Even after dropping charges for 328 people, relating to freedom of speech, some remain incarcerated for their participation in meetings and rallies challenging the monarchy.[9]
Bahrain has extended a crackdown on the opposition by revoking 31 activists nationalities claiming that they damaged national security.[10] Some may perceive these actions as being a policy driven in retaliation for the unrest last year.
In order for national dialogue to work, the government must convince the opposition of their integrity. Imprisoning opposition members and activists, often in the absence of due process of law, will only damage the government’s credibility.
3. Do more.A true culture of freedom of expression will require that the Government of the Kingdom of Bahrain sets a better example. Perhaps the best start that could be made would be the reform of State TV.
FREEDOM FROM WANT
The Human Development Index, as included in the 2011 UNDP Human Development Report, ranked Bahrain42nd out of 187 countries with comparable data. This would suggest a high level of well-being, especially when compared to other Arab countries in the region. However, disparities in wealth are patent. The poorest neighbourhoods of Manamaand the most underdeveloped villages of the island are, for the most part, inhabited by the Shi’a community. In 2010 unemployment figures were reported as just 3.7%, which shows an increase in employment through a global recession. However, a particular worry is that Shi’a citizens are underrepresented in the higher tiers of many public sector jobs. This leads to accusations that the government favours non-Shi’a.
After the protests of 14th February, the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) reported 1,624 complaints from people alleging they had been fired or suspended from their jobs over the protests. Many of these were from the Shi’a community. However, claims have been made that all 1,624 have been given the opportunity to be reinstated.[11]
Socio-economic inequality is an issue that can ferment resentment in any society. Creating a more defined ‘us versus them’ framework will only boost fundamentalist and hard-line voices within the opposition. The government of the Kingdom of Bahrainmust address the socio-economic inequalities that exist within Bahrain’s borders in order to tackle any further frustration and unrest.
The government still invests heavily in its public relations in Washington and London, so evidently cares greatly about its political and economic relations with these key Western capitals. The unrest in Bahrain has strained the country's relations with its traditional friends in the US and UK, who face criticism at home over their ties with Bahrain.
An ongoing uprising in the nation will only put further strain on an already hard-hit economy and strategic relationships in the West. It is in the best interest of the government to stem the island nation’s economic troubles as this will help bring a quick and peaceful resolution to the unrest.
Through the publication of the BICI report the Kingdom of Bahrain have been using international best practice to address the problems that occurred and ways for Bahrain to move forward. The reforms being made are ongoing and are being produced in legislative form. However, without the full implementation of the reforms such legislation only acts as a facade. [12]
FREEDOM OF FEAR
In Bahrain, freedom from fear is inextricably linked to freedom of religion and of expression. Trust in the government is the cornerstone for any successful and legitimate state, and if the government of the Kingdom of Bahrain wishes to see progress in terms of national dialogue and an end to unrest, they must increase the confidence of their citizens in their own security forces in order to pre-empt any tension that might arise in the run up to the 2014 elections.
The NCF recommends two principal proposals:
1. Ensure that the security forces reform their practices.Incidents of police brutality towards those in custody have significantly reduced but instances still occur. The tactics of security forces should always be open to reform. Social media and networking sites are showing footage of violence on both sides of the conflict, but it is the tactics of the security forces that have attracted the most attention and criticism. BICI found that the security forces were responsible for thirteen civilian deaths that occurred during the protests, and even goes on to describe the violent causes of these deaths. It should be noted that the BICI report only looks at a three month window during 2011, and that further deaths have occurred since. The commission also reported deaths due to torture in police custody, and many deaths that occurred after the protests were due to the inhalation of tear gas. Furthermore, the commission found that ‘Bahrain security forces systematically raided houses in order to arrest individuals, and in so doing terrified the occupants. The security forces intentionally broke down doors, forced entry and sometimes ransacked the houses. This practice was often accompanied by sectarian insults and verbal abuse.’ [13]
The excessive force used by the Bahrain security forces must be thoroughly addressed if there is to be any hope of rebuilding the trust so crucially needed between citizen and state. The government must now abide by its own rule of law and maintain the principle that no one is above the law, even and especially those in all hierarchies of the security forces. The government of the Kingdom of Bahrain must continue to implement the BICI recommendations that there should be full investigations into any reports of torture, murder and harassment by security forces. The implementation of accountability measures such as the appointment of a Ministry of Interior Ombudsman are steps in the right direction but are by no means of themselves sufficient. The Bahraingovernment have recently made restitutions of $6.2 million (BD 2,340,000) to be paid to 39 families over the deaths of 39 relatives.[14]This is a significant confidence building exercise by the state, however financial restitutions will have to be matched with sincere reforms. [15]
Chief author of the BICI report, Cherif Bassiouni, has been critical of the reform process. He stated that progress had been made but the reform process has stagnated. In relation to reforms in the security services he stated: “If you have approximately 200 cases and you refer only nine cases to trial in a period of a year and you have one conviction, it doesn’t seem to be a satisfactory result.”
2. Consider further clemency for medical professionals and guarantee the provision of adequate healthcare to all.
Since February 2011, 95 medics have been detained by security forces. Although the behaviour of some of the medical professionals was difficult to reconcile with the exercise of their medical responsibilities, some of the allegations against them were unfounded.[16]Furthermore, a report by Physicians for Human Rights accuses the government of politicising and militarising the health system, claiming that the Government of Bahrain has denied a large segment of the population safe access to impartial medical care, resulting in widespread fear among civilians seeking medical treatment.
Conclusion
For the Kingdom of Bahrain, time is of the essence. The longer the current wave of unrest continues and the more isolated the opposition is from the government, the more radicalised the opposition will become. And the more radicalised the opposition becomes, the more desperate the government will become. Syria serves as an awful reminder of how this security dilemma can spiral out of control. There have been calls for reform but without sincere steps towards negotiated reforms the situation will undoubtedly deteriorate.
If the government do not act fast, they are in danger of marginalising the moderate opposition and strengthening the extremist opposition. Political stagnation means that all parties will refuse to compromise, and without compromise there will be no dialogue, national reconciliation or a consensual political settlement on the horizon. The prospect of Gulf unity could further frighten the opposition as such a union appears to shore up Sunni power on the Gulf. The Bahrain opposition, in despair, might resort to more desperate tactics, possibly even to violence. The current political stagnation in Bahrainneeds to be addressed as it is negatively impacting all political, social and economic aspects of public life. All parties should accept the principle of consensus as a basic element in alleviating the problem.
If resistance goes on and the youth movement become more and more politicised, the opposition’s vision for the future will leave less and less room for negotiation. The government of the Kingdom of Bahrain must act fast, to ensure that the political situation is resolved in time for the 2014 elections.
[Ends]
[1] Figures from the 2010 Census, Central Informatics Organisation[2] The Shi’a community is present in certain sectors of the government, especially government ministries such as the Ministries of Health and Industry, where up to 50% of the senior posts are staffed by Shiites.[3] One such example is the airing of the “Al Rased” television programme on Bahraintelevision showing images of protesters and describing them as traitors with links to Iran(Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry p393).[4] This figure was quoted at a meeting hosted by the Next Century Foundation at the Embassy of the Kingdom of Bahrainin London on the 16th May 2012.[5] Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry. P329 [6] Al Wefaq’s claim that it garnered over 50% of the vote is disputed by the government which claims that the party obtained 43% of the vote.[7] Acceded to by Bahrain in 2006[8] Restrictions on public demonstrations and other public gatherings were introduced on 30 October 2012. Bahrain said the ban was a temporary step.[9] Key figures such as Nabeel Rejab, and Zainab and Abdulhadi al-Khawaja attracted international attention at their arrest. Nabeel Rejab is serving a three year sentence and claims to be held in solitary confinement. Abdulhadi al-Khawaja is currently serving a life sentence after being arrested in April 2011 for his activity as a protest organiser. His daughter Zainab al-Khawaja has been repeatedly arrested. [10] On 7 November2012, Bahrain decided to revoke the nationality of 31 citizens for 'having undermined state security'. The decision violates the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The men include London-based dissident Saeed al-Shehabi.[11] In reality these claims are slightly misleading. Some employees have been placed in work other than their original occupation, often in lesser positions, whilst some others remain in the Ministry of Labour’s job placement program and have yet to find gainful employment.[12] As Cherif Bassiouni himself recently stated: “A number of recommendations on accountability were either not implemented or implemented only half-heartedly.” [13] Bahrain Commission of Independent Inquiry, article 1172, p.280[14] These victims include all 35 deaths described in the BICI report as well as 4 deaths – three civilians and one police – that followed the events. [15] Three compensation mechanisms have been established to make these restitutions however there are now details given on two of the mechanisms and the third has been effectively stopped by Royal Decree.[16] Twenty medical professionals who were involved in the 2011 protests were sentenced to prison terms (Dr Ali al-Ekry was sentenced to 15 years in prison on more than a dozen charges; the remaining 19 doctors/medical workers received lesser prison sentences). They were accused of crimes against the state which included inciting hatred, occupying Salmaniya Hospital, and attempting to overthrow the Government. A further 28 medical workers faced misdemeanour charges. Of the 48 accused, 47 were Shi’a. Following a recent trial verdict, only two of the defendants now face comparatively long prison terms. They should be treated with clemency. Then on 21 November 2012, 23 medics were sentenced to 3 months imprisonment or to pay a fine of 200 Dinars to have their prison sentences suspended. They all had the right to an appeal.
BAHRAIN AND THE FOUR FREEDOMS
The Kingdom of Bahrain is a nation cherished by many for its multicultural heritage and abundance of warm, hospitable people. The general perception is that the concept of democracy is a quintessential aspiration in a Middle Eastwhere democracy is the exception rather than the rule. However in the few instances in which democracy is given its head (e.g. the experiments in Algeria and Palestine) the results often seem unpalatable and are then undermined by an intolerant West. We would be the last to insist on the concept that Bahrainbecomes truly democratic. Nevertheless, if we are to preserve the Bahrain we know and have come to love, changes must be made to accommodate the aspirations of its people. Therefore this report will focus on those reforms that would transform Bahrain, making it more sustainable as a Kingdom and reduce levels of social turmoil which Bahrain has been subjected to for years.
While King Hamad Al Khalifa deserves credit for his decision to establish the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI), and for his prompt endorsement of its recommendations, it should be noted that some of the recommendations have not been fully implemented. It is also important to note that while the BICI report was a comprehensive investigation, it only covers a small period within a situation that continues week on week.
We believe that the full and speedy implementation of the recommendations published in the BICI report would go a long way towards easing the tension in Bahrain and restoring the trust desperately needed to push forward the processes of reconciliation and reform.
The NCF also believes that it would also be helpful to look at the situation in Bahrain under the heading of 'human security'.
The notion of ‘human security’ rather than ‘national security’ is one that is too often ignored. President Roosevelt’s four freedoms: Freedom of Religion, Freedom of Expression, Freedom from Want, and Freedom from Fear, serve as the basis of this concept of human security, and it is these four freedoms that this report focuses on in regard to Bahrain.
Our understandings of these freedoms, in relation to Bahrain, are as follow:
· Freedom of Speech and Expression: This goes beyond the freedom to talk and express oneself. It includes any act of seeking, receiving and conveying information, regardless of the medium used, which obviously includes the freedom of the press.
· Freedom of Religion: The freedom of every person to worship in his own way in equality with other religions and without persecution.
· Freedom from Want: Freedom from hunger and economic desperation, as individual freedom cannot truly exist without economic security.
· Freedom from Fear: Freedom to be able to live in an environment where you neither expect arrest without trial, nor to be the object of violent protest, nor of violent suppression of protest. An environment where you are free from the fear of persecution for your beliefs or views.
Between 2008 and 2010, Bahrainimproved its ranking in the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index by eight places. However, by 2011 it had slipped 22, ranking at 144 out of the 167 countries in the Index.
With general elections scheduled to be held in 2014, the government of the Kingdom of Bahrain should redouble efforts to reverse this decline through ongoing reforms in an attempt to make those elections a time for celebration rather than conflict.
The Next Century Foundation recommends that the 2014 elections be a target date for the government of Bahrain to address its internal issues. The expedient implementation of the findings of the BICI report would go a long way to ensuring this happens.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Article 22 of the Bahrain Constitution and legislative framework provides for the freedom of an individual to profess one’s faith. However, in practice limits have been placed on this freedom. Of a total population of 1,234,571, there are 866,888 Muslims and the rest are a mix of Christians, Hindus, Jews and Bahais.[1]These groups live and worship side-by-side, practicing their religion without interference from the government or other religious groups. However, the Shi’a community claim to be victims of systematic discrimination on religious grounds.
Bahraindoes not publish statistics on the sectarian breakdown of its citizens and Shi’ite population estimates vary greatly. Tensions between these two groups (Shi’a and Sunni) have resulted in socio-economic problems and limits being placed on the extent to which the Shi’a may participate in government.[2]These tensions came to the fore and, combined with other political, social and economic factors that cut across ethnic and sectarian lines, contributed to the uprisings on 14th February 2011.
The NCF proposes four initiatives to begin to tackle the continuing tensions:
1. Avoid defining the conflict along sectarian lines.
Most of those who participated in the uprisings over the past year have been from the Shi’a community. This has led many to the view that the conflict is sectarian. However, the conflict is not and has not been wholly sectarian. The protests cut across both religious and class divides; many problems exist outside the Shi’a-Sunni framework.
Government officials and Bahrainstate television have repeatedly blamed Iranfor inciting the popular unrest (Iran’s agenda being to strengthen Shi’a influence) but this is seen by the opposition as side-stepping and belittling the real issues. They view it is an indication that the government does not take their problems seriously. Although Bahrainmay legitimately feel threatened by Iranand its aspirations to establish ascendency in the region, it is dangerous for the Bahraingovernment, through state television, to point the finger elsewhere rather than address the issues within its own borders and amongst its own people. [3]
The government has made attempts to refrain from using the sectarian nationalist narrative that is frequently employed by opposition groups. However, instances have occurred. It is crucial that all media outlets, particularly those owned or controlled by the state, should abide by a strict code of conduct that would safeguard against involvement in spreading hatred or inciting violence. The Bahrain Journalists Association has adopted a new Code of Ethics as of 20 Jan 2012. It is important that this code is adhered to as it will encourage the promotion of the values of justice, equality, tolerance and peaceful coexistence. Moreover, it is the duty of the Government in any society to ensure the impartiality of state controlled media outlets and their accessibility to the opposition and to all sectors of the community. The Information Affairs Authority has received advice on how to achieve structural reform to enhance neutrality, pluralism, credibility, rule of law and national cohesion. It should act on that advice.
The main opposition bloc and the leading opposition party, al Wefaq, have often tried to avoid sectarian divisions, calling for Sunnis and Shiites alike to ‘wave the flag of democracy’. Even though al Wefaq is regarded as the moderate opposition, it must be recognised that there are extremist threads in the complicated and ever-shifting warp and weft of Bahrain’s political fabric. As the conflict has continued, more idealistic, hard-line voices have emerged who have taken advantage of increasing anger on the streets. This serves to emphasise the need for a quick political resolution of the issues that divide the people of Bahrain.
Another opposition faction that has attempted to avoid defining the conflict along sectarian lines is Wa'ad, a secular leftist party whose secretary-general Ebrahim Sharif has been in jail since April 2011. Wa'ad are not particularly popular - all the popular forces today are Islamists, as elsewhere - but they represent an important trend among intellectuals and business people. They have a strong track record of campaigning against sectarianism. Many Wa'ad politicians have married across the sectarian divide (including Ebrahim Sharif, whose wife is a secular Shi’a).
Ebrahim Sharif has always called for reform under a constitutional monarchy (as for that matter has Al Wefaq), and has been resolutely against violence. A growing section of the opposition has been calling for a republican option, as support for groups such as Al Wefaq declines. Large swathes of those protesting are best described as the “silent opposition”. These are individuals who are out on the street but are not affiliated with a political party and go under the “February 14” banner. Most opposition groups have to listen to these protestors or risk losing legitimacy.
Time is of the essence: the longer the resistance continues, the louder the extreme voices will become. The government of the Kingdom of Bahrainmust begin to strengthen the moderate, pragmatic groups among the opposition, and stop defining the conflict along sectarian lines. It must acknowledge the fact that there are some Sunnis in opposition to the government. If the conflict continues to increase its sectarian nature, moderates in the opposition are likely to be forced to choose sides, and invariably they will choose those the side they see as ‘their own’. The moderate opposition would then be lost.
2. Address the issue of citizenship within Bahrain.
The issue of citizenship has long been a contentious one. Less than half of Bahrain’s population are Bahraini citizens due to the influx of migrants and guest-workers. There have been accusations that the Bahraingovernment has practiced ethnic discrimination in regards to its policy of granting citizenship i.e. attempting to favour Sunni over Shi’a during the naturalization and citizenship processes. A Bahrainrepresentative has argued that these were unfounded allegations, and that between 2000-2010, as many as 11,000 Shi’as had gained citizenship[4], yet through calculations of the difference between the actual rate of growth of the number of citizens and the natural population growth rate since 2001 best estimates are that 60,000 foreigners have been granted citizenship during this period. The number of non-Shi’as being granted citizenship is therefore comparatively high.
3. Address the demolition of Shi’ite mosques and places of worship.
A number of Shi’ite places of worship have been demolished by the government since the 14th February protests. The government of the Kingdom of Bahrainhas not denied that these sites have been demolished, though it does dispute the motive behind them. The BICI Report set the number of demolished places at 30 and the government of Bahrainhas unconditionally accepted this. The government claims that these buildings were illegal and without the proper permits, but the timing and nature of the demolitions calls this into question. The BICI report acknowledges that only 5 out of 30 places of worship had requisite building permits while also stating, “the Commission notes with some concern the timing of demolition (1 March 2011 to 11 May 2011), which relates it to events of February and March. The Government of Bahrain must have been aware of the construction of these structures and that they lacked proper legal permits and did not conform to building regulations. Nonetheless, the Government of Bahrain had not stopped the construction of these structures nor taken action to remove them for a number of years. The Government should have realised that under the circumstances, in particular the timing, the manner in which demolitions were conducted and the fact that these were primarily Shia religious structures, the demolitions would be perceived as a collective punishment and would therefore inflame the tension between the Government of Bahrain and the Shia population.”[5]Fortunately, the Government suspended its action. However, the first week of December 2012 witnessed the removal of some Shi’a mosques that were being reconstructed. And during the Shi’a ceremony of Muharram in November 2012, the Interior Ministry jailed two Shia preachers and summoned scores for interrogation on the religious content of their speeches, something that has never happened before in Bahrain. There is no clear evidence that the Government intended to punish the citizens for their religious practises. However, the timing of such actions clearly helped to inflame the situation.
In an attempt to address this, on 22 May 2011, the King announced that new Shi’a places of worship would be built. The BICI report also recommended ‘a follow up on the King‘s statement to the effect that the Government of Bahrain will consider rebuilding, at its expense, some of the demolished religious structures in accordance with administrative regulations’. In section 1336, the Commission welcomes the Government of Bahrain addressing this question at the earliest possible time. A report by the Bahrain Centre of Human Rights, published on 26thMarch 2012, claims that rebuilding has begun on five mosques. The report also claims that when residents tried to rebuild the mosques themselves, they were prevented from doing so by the authorities, citing the example of the Ameer Mohammed Mosque, which has been rebuilt and demolished twice. The government of Bahrain claims that work has begun on 12 places at a total cost of US$26 million and that actual construction work has begun on five, while land has been fenced for the remaining seven on which construction work is to be phased in. It should be noted, however, that reconstruction has not necessarily taken place on the sites of the existing mosques. Some of these places of worship were on sites that have had religious significance (e.g. burial sites) for over 200 years and were built because of the religious significance of the site.
Although some of the building may have been without the proper permits and thus been deemed illegal, the demolition of Shi’ite places of worship is perceived by the Shi’a community as persecution and fuels both resentment and violent backlashes. It also further radicalises the opposition and diminishes their desire for dialogue. The issue of the sanctity of religious places is supremely sensitive, and by not working more quickly and with more dedication to reverse the damage done, the government will only foster greater division between itself and Bahrain’s Shi’a community.
4. Remove laws and conventions that deliberately prevent Shi’ites from gaining influence.
Although there have been great improvements in the openness of Bahrain’s politics, there are still areas which need improvement. There are several practises in Bahrain’s politics that deliberately prevent or restrict Shi’a participation in the governance of Bahrain, thus leaving them politically disenfranchised. In the 2010 elections, although Al Wefaq won only 18 out of the 40 of the seats in the Council of Deputies, they garnered a majority of the votes. Thus, despite gaining more than 50% of the votes, they only won 45% of the available seats.[6]
The geographic boundaries of constituencies in Bahrainare mapped out along ethnic lines to establish political advantage. The number of voters in each voting district varies greatly, from 12,000 to 500, which of course is seen as a deliberate attempt to restrict the number of seats Shi’ite political parties are likely to win. Because Bahrain in any case has a bicameral system with a government appointed by the King rather than by parliament, the manipulation of constituency size to this degree is unnecessary to guarantee the survival of the monarchy. The practice should be abandoned. The districting issue has been put on the negotiation table as part of the National Dialogue.
A further issue is that of election monitoring. Though observers from Bahrain’s non-governmental organisations, independent political and civil societies groups regularly monitor elections, international observers are barred. This is not to say that Bahrain’s election results should be called into question, but international election monitors should be allowed access to comply with international best practice. These issues should certainly be addressed before the 2014 elections.
5. Both the opposition and the government should make stronger commitment to dialogue
Having attained positions in parliament, opposition groups should utilise this key forum, particularly since a parliamentary majority could obtain a legislative veto.
Al Wefaq needs to find a credible way to re-engage in the parliamentary political process and the government needs to help facilitate this. To encourage Al Wefaq to re-engage serious concessions should be made by the government. Stepping back into the National Assembly without such concessions could be political suicide. If nothing is done and the situation continues to become more polarised, Al Wefaq may lose its popularity in the street and find itself pushed aside as hard-line opposition voices grow louder.
All opposition parties should also take part in the National Dialogue. If the National Dialogue meetings are to be successful and credible, the full spectrum of Bahrain’s political views should be present. To encourage opposition groups to a take part in such dialogue, bilateral meetings should also be organised to take place alongside the National Dialogue between the opposition (i.e. only the opposition not the pro-government parties) and the government. This would build confidence on the part of opposition groups and guarantee that their legitimate grievances are being heard. It should however be noted that a number of opposition members are in prison and therefore cannot attend any National Dialogue.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights[7]states that "everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice". Of course, total freedom of expression does not exist absolutely in any country, but freedom of expression remains an essential part of society, especially one as diverse as Bahrain. Suppression of the ideas and desires of any group in a society inevitably leads to the radicalisation of those who feel stifled. If they are not able to express themselves in words they will do so in actions.
The Government of Bahrain declared a three month state of emergency and banned protests to “maintain security” and safeguard “civil peace” in March 2011. The government claimed that demonstrators had threatened “national security” by calling for the overthrow of the government. Protests have now once again been banned,[8]this time just before the beginning of Muharram, which has effectively created a situation of Marshall Law.
The NCF recommends three initiatives:
1. Enforce constitutional protections guaranteeing freedom of expression and of the press.
Articles 23 and 24 of the constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrainguarantee freedom of expression, both in terms of opinion and the press. In order for the people of the Kingdom of Bahrain to have confidence in the integrity of the government and its promises, guarantees must be given. Any form of suppression of press freedom is counterproductive and therefore serves no useful purpose. Indeed, greater press freedom might act as a safety valve, actually reducing tension.
2. Address the treatment of opposition members.
Since February 14th, opposition members and activists have been imprisoned without trial and there have been reports of torture and death in custody. The ICRC has been in country since January 2012, freely visiting police stations, temporary detention facilities, jails and detainees. However restrictions have been placed on human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.
Though the government has agreed to retry key opposition leaders, many have not been released. Even after dropping charges for 328 people, relating to freedom of speech, some remain incarcerated for their participation in meetings and rallies challenging the monarchy.[9]
Bahrain has extended a crackdown on the opposition by revoking 31 activists nationalities claiming that they damaged national security.[10] Some may perceive these actions as being a policy driven in retaliation for the unrest last year.
In order for national dialogue to work, the government must convince the opposition of their integrity. Imprisoning opposition members and activists, often in the absence of due process of law, will only damage the government’s credibility.
3. Do more.A true culture of freedom of expression will require that the Government of the Kingdom of Bahrain sets a better example. Perhaps the best start that could be made would be the reform of State TV.
FREEDOM FROM WANT
The Human Development Index, as included in the 2011 UNDP Human Development Report, ranked Bahrain42nd out of 187 countries with comparable data. This would suggest a high level of well-being, especially when compared to other Arab countries in the region. However, disparities in wealth are patent. The poorest neighbourhoods of Manamaand the most underdeveloped villages of the island are, for the most part, inhabited by the Shi’a community. In 2010 unemployment figures were reported as just 3.7%, which shows an increase in employment through a global recession. However, a particular worry is that Shi’a citizens are underrepresented in the higher tiers of many public sector jobs. This leads to accusations that the government favours non-Shi’a.
After the protests of 14th February, the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) reported 1,624 complaints from people alleging they had been fired or suspended from their jobs over the protests. Many of these were from the Shi’a community. However, claims have been made that all 1,624 have been given the opportunity to be reinstated.[11]
Socio-economic inequality is an issue that can ferment resentment in any society. Creating a more defined ‘us versus them’ framework will only boost fundamentalist and hard-line voices within the opposition. The government of the Kingdom of Bahrainmust address the socio-economic inequalities that exist within Bahrain’s borders in order to tackle any further frustration and unrest.
The government still invests heavily in its public relations in Washington and London, so evidently cares greatly about its political and economic relations with these key Western capitals. The unrest in Bahrain has strained the country's relations with its traditional friends in the US and UK, who face criticism at home over their ties with Bahrain.
An ongoing uprising in the nation will only put further strain on an already hard-hit economy and strategic relationships in the West. It is in the best interest of the government to stem the island nation’s economic troubles as this will help bring a quick and peaceful resolution to the unrest.
Through the publication of the BICI report the Kingdom of Bahrain have been using international best practice to address the problems that occurred and ways for Bahrain to move forward. The reforms being made are ongoing and are being produced in legislative form. However, without the full implementation of the reforms such legislation only acts as a facade. [12]
FREEDOM OF FEAR
In Bahrain, freedom from fear is inextricably linked to freedom of religion and of expression. Trust in the government is the cornerstone for any successful and legitimate state, and if the government of the Kingdom of Bahrain wishes to see progress in terms of national dialogue and an end to unrest, they must increase the confidence of their citizens in their own security forces in order to pre-empt any tension that might arise in the run up to the 2014 elections.
The NCF recommends two principal proposals:
1. Ensure that the security forces reform their practices.Incidents of police brutality towards those in custody have significantly reduced but instances still occur. The tactics of security forces should always be open to reform. Social media and networking sites are showing footage of violence on both sides of the conflict, but it is the tactics of the security forces that have attracted the most attention and criticism. BICI found that the security forces were responsible for thirteen civilian deaths that occurred during the protests, and even goes on to describe the violent causes of these deaths. It should be noted that the BICI report only looks at a three month window during 2011, and that further deaths have occurred since. The commission also reported deaths due to torture in police custody, and many deaths that occurred after the protests were due to the inhalation of tear gas. Furthermore, the commission found that ‘Bahrain security forces systematically raided houses in order to arrest individuals, and in so doing terrified the occupants. The security forces intentionally broke down doors, forced entry and sometimes ransacked the houses. This practice was often accompanied by sectarian insults and verbal abuse.’ [13]
The excessive force used by the Bahrain security forces must be thoroughly addressed if there is to be any hope of rebuilding the trust so crucially needed between citizen and state. The government must now abide by its own rule of law and maintain the principle that no one is above the law, even and especially those in all hierarchies of the security forces. The government of the Kingdom of Bahrain must continue to implement the BICI recommendations that there should be full investigations into any reports of torture, murder and harassment by security forces. The implementation of accountability measures such as the appointment of a Ministry of Interior Ombudsman are steps in the right direction but are by no means of themselves sufficient. The Bahraingovernment have recently made restitutions of $6.2 million (BD 2,340,000) to be paid to 39 families over the deaths of 39 relatives.[14]This is a significant confidence building exercise by the state, however financial restitutions will have to be matched with sincere reforms. [15]
Chief author of the BICI report, Cherif Bassiouni, has been critical of the reform process. He stated that progress had been made but the reform process has stagnated. In relation to reforms in the security services he stated: “If you have approximately 200 cases and you refer only nine cases to trial in a period of a year and you have one conviction, it doesn’t seem to be a satisfactory result.”
2. Consider further clemency for medical professionals and guarantee the provision of adequate healthcare to all.
Since February 2011, 95 medics have been detained by security forces. Although the behaviour of some of the medical professionals was difficult to reconcile with the exercise of their medical responsibilities, some of the allegations against them were unfounded.[16]Furthermore, a report by Physicians for Human Rights accuses the government of politicising and militarising the health system, claiming that the Government of Bahrain has denied a large segment of the population safe access to impartial medical care, resulting in widespread fear among civilians seeking medical treatment.
Conclusion
For the Kingdom of Bahrain, time is of the essence. The longer the current wave of unrest continues and the more isolated the opposition is from the government, the more radicalised the opposition will become. And the more radicalised the opposition becomes, the more desperate the government will become. Syria serves as an awful reminder of how this security dilemma can spiral out of control. There have been calls for reform but without sincere steps towards negotiated reforms the situation will undoubtedly deteriorate.
If the government do not act fast, they are in danger of marginalising the moderate opposition and strengthening the extremist opposition. Political stagnation means that all parties will refuse to compromise, and without compromise there will be no dialogue, national reconciliation or a consensual political settlement on the horizon. The prospect of Gulf unity could further frighten the opposition as such a union appears to shore up Sunni power on the Gulf. The Bahrain opposition, in despair, might resort to more desperate tactics, possibly even to violence. The current political stagnation in Bahrainneeds to be addressed as it is negatively impacting all political, social and economic aspects of public life. All parties should accept the principle of consensus as a basic element in alleviating the problem.
If resistance goes on and the youth movement become more and more politicised, the opposition’s vision for the future will leave less and less room for negotiation. The government of the Kingdom of Bahrain must act fast, to ensure that the political situation is resolved in time for the 2014 elections.
[Ends]
[1] Figures from the 2010 Census, Central Informatics Organisation[2] The Shi’a community is present in certain sectors of the government, especially government ministries such as the Ministries of Health and Industry, where up to 50% of the senior posts are staffed by Shiites.[3] One such example is the airing of the “Al Rased” television programme on Bahraintelevision showing images of protesters and describing them as traitors with links to Iran(Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry p393).[4] This figure was quoted at a meeting hosted by the Next Century Foundation at the Embassy of the Kingdom of Bahrainin London on the 16th May 2012.[5] Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry. P329 [6] Al Wefaq’s claim that it garnered over 50% of the vote is disputed by the government which claims that the party obtained 43% of the vote.[7] Acceded to by Bahrain in 2006[8] Restrictions on public demonstrations and other public gatherings were introduced on 30 October 2012. Bahrain said the ban was a temporary step.[9] Key figures such as Nabeel Rejab, and Zainab and Abdulhadi al-Khawaja attracted international attention at their arrest. Nabeel Rejab is serving a three year sentence and claims to be held in solitary confinement. Abdulhadi al-Khawaja is currently serving a life sentence after being arrested in April 2011 for his activity as a protest organiser. His daughter Zainab al-Khawaja has been repeatedly arrested. [10] On 7 November2012, Bahrain decided to revoke the nationality of 31 citizens for 'having undermined state security'. The decision violates the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The men include London-based dissident Saeed al-Shehabi.[11] In reality these claims are slightly misleading. Some employees have been placed in work other than their original occupation, often in lesser positions, whilst some others remain in the Ministry of Labour’s job placement program and have yet to find gainful employment.[12] As Cherif Bassiouni himself recently stated: “A number of recommendations on accountability were either not implemented or implemented only half-heartedly.” [13] Bahrain Commission of Independent Inquiry, article 1172, p.280[14] These victims include all 35 deaths described in the BICI report as well as 4 deaths – three civilians and one police – that followed the events. [15] Three compensation mechanisms have been established to make these restitutions however there are now details given on two of the mechanisms and the third has been effectively stopped by Royal Decree.[16] Twenty medical professionals who were involved in the 2011 protests were sentenced to prison terms (Dr Ali al-Ekry was sentenced to 15 years in prison on more than a dozen charges; the remaining 19 doctors/medical workers received lesser prison sentences). They were accused of crimes against the state which included inciting hatred, occupying Salmaniya Hospital, and attempting to overthrow the Government. A further 28 medical workers faced misdemeanour charges. Of the 48 accused, 47 were Shi’a. Following a recent trial verdict, only two of the defendants now face comparatively long prison terms. They should be treated with clemency. Then on 21 November 2012, 23 medics were sentenced to 3 months imprisonment or to pay a fine of 200 Dinars to have their prison sentences suspended. They all had the right to an appeal.
BAHRAIN INTRODUCTION
The Bahrain blog is dedicated to the peace process in resolving the dispute between the Sunni majority population and the ruling Sunni Khalifah royal family and government. The Shias began protesting against systematic discrimination against them and demanding a greater say in government. The conflict escalated to a point where the Saudi military were called in to crush the demonstrations where many were hurt and killed.
Following the protests, the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry was established on 29 June 2011 to investigate the events that took place on 14 February 2011. The aim of the Commission was asked to provide a narrative of the events, any acts of violence, any actors involved and investigate allegations of police brutality, violence by protesters as well as allegations of disappearances, torture and media harassment.
Despite widespread protests against the results of the Commission’s findings, opposition groups have agreed with dialogue with the government. For now, the talks seem shaky and the future uncertain.
Israel and Palestine Update
6th of March - This year's Gaza marathon was cancelledby the UN agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA), following the decision by the Gaza based group Hamas to ban women from competing alongside men, revoking their previous stance.
7th of March - Mohammed Asfour, a 22-year-old student studying sports, diedafter being shot in head by a rubber-coated steel bullet fired by Israeli troops during a protest in the West Bank. The incident took place during demonstrations across the territories following news of Arafat Jaradat, a Palestinian who died in Israeli custody, whilst being interrogated by the Shin Bet internal security service. The death of Jaradat heightened the tension in Israel as well as Palestine, as militants from Fatah's Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades fired a rocket at Israel as a "preliminary response” to his death.
8th of March - Palestinian Bedouins could be forcedto leave their land in the West Bank after private Israeli plans for a new town in the Ma'ale Adumim region were revealed. According to the Bedouins and their lawyers, it is the first stage in clearing the area of Palestinian controlled land.
11th of March - Majdi al-Rimawi, a Palestinian convicted of killing Israeli government minister Rehavam Zeevi, has been granted honourary citizenship in the Paris suburb of Bezons. The decision has been criticised and Yigal Palmor, Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman said that was “no political view” that can justify the giving of this honour.
12th of March – The World Bank has warned that the combined fiscal deterioration of the Palestinian Authority together with the Israeli closures and restrictions has caused “lasting damage” to the Palestinian economy. Economic activity declined considerably in 2012, in comparison to the healthy GDP growth in recent years. Key aspects have been the stagnation in the manufacturing sector; the productivity of the agricultural sector roughly halving; the decline in both manufacturing and agriculture sectors with the share of exports in the Palestinian economy dropping to 7% in 2011, from 10% in 1996; in addition to high levels in unemployment.
Notes from Gaza
The following notes are from Samuel Morris, who has been in Gaza on behalf of the NCF. Sam has been travelling in Israel and Palestine for much of the past month and these are his observations. As with all such comments from NCF sources, they and should be treated as a personal view, rather than an NCF perspective:
The last few weeks have seen protests spark across the West Bank and Gaza. The death of Arafat Jaradat while in Israeli custody, was the catalyst for this outpouring of anger. The treatment of prisoners has long been an issue, especially with the ongoing hunger strikes by a number of Palestinians being held in Israeli prisons without charge, most notably Samer Issawi whose hungerstrike has been running for well over 200 days. These protests united the Palestinian populous. In Gaza, marches and protests were held, factions united. For a few days the flags of Hamas, Fatah, Islamic Jihad and the DFLP flew over the broken tomb of the unknown solider, destroyed by Hamas in 2006, in the Rimal district of Gaza city. In the West Bank the protests turned more violent. Unlike in Gaza, in the West Bank there are IDF soldiers at whom protesters can focus their anger, resulting in clashes over a number of days in towns throughout the West Bank. Retaliation from Gaza was limited to a rocket, fired from southern gaza hitting a road in Ashkelon. Responsibility for the rocket was claimed by Fatah's armed wing, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. Many news publications reported this as the first breach of the November ceasefire, however, Israeli forces have shot and killed three people and injured at least 50 for straying to close to the perimeter fence since the beginning of the ceasefire.
In Gaza, there is little will for the escalation of this so called "Prisoners Intifada" in the Gaza Strip. Recent memories of the short but brutal war in November are still fresh in the mind. Hamas are more concerned with internal security issues than a third intifada. Security measures have tightened since "Operation Pillar of Defence" and the fear of losing secrets to the Israelis through "collaborators" is rife. Gaza courts have handed out 30 death sentences since 2007, many of them to people convicted of helping Israeli security forces. Hamas are stepping up their attempts to catch such collaborators. Their main concern, like Israel, is security, which has lead to a number of new security measures. International visitors must now apply for entry permission to be able to visit Gaza. These are usually limited to 33 days, but can be extended. More recently, Hamas has made it mandatory for any Palestinian leaving Gaza via Erez, into Israel, to have exit permission. Making the all but impossible task to gaining entry to Israel, even harder.
The eight day war, was seen as a victory by Hamas. Their perspective is that it showed that Palestinian resistance in the Gaza Strip is still strong. The conflict, brief but brutal, was seen as a success due to the strong response by Hamas. Even with their support waning in the Gaza strip, the perspective of many on the ground in Gaza is that Hamas showed strength during the operation. The brevity of the conflict, and the decision by Israel not to send in land forces, meant that it was far less damaging than Operation Cast Lead in 2007, but once again the response by Israel was seen as disproportionate.
On the surface Gaza has been becoming more prosperous. Hundreds of new buildings are being built throughout the Gaza Strip. However this is just a facade. Gaza is still oppressed, the problems are still there. Poverty and unemployment are rife. Shops may be better stocked with Israeli goods but life is still hugely difficult for the majority of those living in the Gaza strip. UNRWA recently published a report entitled "Gaza 2020". The report states that the population of Gaza will increase from its current 1.6 million to 2.1 million people in 2020. They estimate that this will result in a population density of more than 5,800 people per square kilometre. The report expresses concern that Gazan infrastructure, especially electricity, water and sanitation, are not keeping pace with the needs of this growing population. I can vouch for the fact that the water quality has decreased over the past few years and power cuts are constant; these issues are only set to get worse and the life for the average Gazan is set to get more difficult if Gaza's issues are not resolved. More food stuff and a greater number of cars being shipped in through the Kerem Shalom border crossing from Israel does not help resolve the key issues that that continue to affect Gaza. Without a drastic change to the blockade these key problems will remain and will only get worse as the population grows.
The tunnel trade has been the driving force behind all of the building. Construction materials are all but impossible to get from Israel and are hugely expensive when compared to the price of resourses coming from Egypt via the tunnels. The Gazan economy is still dependant on Israel. Imports have increased in volume from Israel recently, including the number of automobiles, however, the majority of all building materials still come through the tunnels. Prices can fluctuate, doubling overnight because of crackdowns on the Egyptian side of the border. It has been estimated that up to 60 percent of the estimated 1,000 smuggling routes under the border have been closed. Egypt has stated that it was cutting arms smuggling that was destabilizing the Sinai peninsula. However, Egyptian forces recently seized 20,000 liters of fuel ready to be smuggled into Gaza. Hamas is working with Egypt to improve the situation but things remain difficult. Hamas are optimistic in the long run; however, they understand that Egypt has its own problems and it will take time for any real improvements to be made. Morsi is struggling to keep control and Gaza is low on the list of their priorities.
Politically, Hamas are focused on the now stalled unity talks. There is a belief that uniting the Palestinian factions will put them in a stronger position politically. The Arab spring sent a signal, and after participating in a democratic process in January 2006 Hamas want to keep some form of legitimacy. This is why they want the coalition talks to succeed. A unity government ensures Hamas still has the legitimacy to rule that it feels it gained through the 2006 elections. However, legitimate or illegitimate, it is unlikely that anyone will be able to snatch the Gaza Strip from their control. The Hamas enclave, even though filled with dissenting voices, has given the organisation a taste of power and they are unlikely to relinquish their control. Their popularity in the West Bank is of more importance. If presidential election were held now, Hamas would most likely win.
The reconciliation process is difficult, no date for the resumption of talks has been set and the talks that were held were only cosmetic. However, there is optimism that there will be a way forward in the Hamas ranks. This optimism is not translated to the general populous, many of whom believe the bad blood created in 2007 will be too great to overcome. Hamas has blamed the breakdown of the Cairo talks on two problems. The first, confidence. There is still understandable distrust between Fatah and Hamas. Brutal actions in the past are hard to forget. The second is there is a disagreement over the process. Hamas think that Abu Mazen is not fully concentrating on the reconciliation process, that he has one eye on the peace process, America and Israel. However, to Hamas, the peace process is dead, pointless. They expect a right wing government in Israel and for things to remain the same. To them it doesn't matter what happens with the elections in Israel, they have seen many faces come and go and do not expect for there to be any movement politically. They view a unity government as far more important.
Support for Hamas is thin in Gaza. If elections were held it would be likely that Hamas would lose out to Fatah in the Gaza strip but win in the West Bank. There is a lack of hope in the younger sections of society. An apathy towards politics. Many young Palestinians have resigned themselves to a life of repression, conflict and pain. They see no solution to the situation and certainly no solution that would be fair. Without any process leading to the almost dead concept of a two-state solution, all that can be seen is the continuation of the status quo. For Palestine this means continuation of the resistance movement and not a political solution. With continuation of settlement expansion in the West Bank and the establishment of the E-1 plan, the concept of a two-state solution is even more difficult to conceive.
The last few weeks have seen protests spark across the West Bank and Gaza. The death of Arafat Jaradat while in Israeli custody, was the catalyst for this outpouring of anger. The treatment of prisoners has long been an issue, especially with the ongoing hunger strikes by a number of Palestinians being held in Israeli prisons without charge, most notably Samer Issawi whose hungerstrike has been running for well over 200 days. These protests united the Palestinian populous. In Gaza, marches and protests were held, factions united. For a few days the flags of Hamas, Fatah, Islamic Jihad and the DFLP flew over the broken tomb of the unknown solider, destroyed by Hamas in 2006, in the Rimal district of Gaza city. In the West Bank the protests turned more violent. Unlike in Gaza, in the West Bank there are IDF soldiers at whom protesters can focus their anger, resulting in clashes over a number of days in towns throughout the West Bank. Retaliation from Gaza was limited to a rocket, fired from southern gaza hitting a road in Ashkelon. Responsibility for the rocket was claimed by Fatah's armed wing, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. Many news publications reported this as the first breach of the November ceasefire, however, Israeli forces have shot and killed three people and injured at least 50 for straying to close to the perimeter fence since the beginning of the ceasefire.
In Gaza, there is little will for the escalation of this so called "Prisoners Intifada" in the Gaza Strip. Recent memories of the short but brutal war in November are still fresh in the mind. Hamas are more concerned with internal security issues than a third intifada. Security measures have tightened since "Operation Pillar of Defence" and the fear of losing secrets to the Israelis through "collaborators" is rife. Gaza courts have handed out 30 death sentences since 2007, many of them to people convicted of helping Israeli security forces. Hamas are stepping up their attempts to catch such collaborators. Their main concern, like Israel, is security, which has lead to a number of new security measures. International visitors must now apply for entry permission to be able to visit Gaza. These are usually limited to 33 days, but can be extended. More recently, Hamas has made it mandatory for any Palestinian leaving Gaza via Erez, into Israel, to have exit permission. Making the all but impossible task to gaining entry to Israel, even harder.
The eight day war, was seen as a victory by Hamas. Their perspective is that it showed that Palestinian resistance in the Gaza Strip is still strong. The conflict, brief but brutal, was seen as a success due to the strong response by Hamas. Even with their support waning in the Gaza strip, the perspective of many on the ground in Gaza is that Hamas showed strength during the operation. The brevity of the conflict, and the decision by Israel not to send in land forces, meant that it was far less damaging than Operation Cast Lead in 2007, but once again the response by Israel was seen as disproportionate.
On the surface Gaza has been becoming more prosperous. Hundreds of new buildings are being built throughout the Gaza Strip. However this is just a facade. Gaza is still oppressed, the problems are still there. Poverty and unemployment are rife. Shops may be better stocked with Israeli goods but life is still hugely difficult for the majority of those living in the Gaza strip. UNRWA recently published a report entitled "Gaza 2020". The report states that the population of Gaza will increase from its current 1.6 million to 2.1 million people in 2020. They estimate that this will result in a population density of more than 5,800 people per square kilometre. The report expresses concern that Gazan infrastructure, especially electricity, water and sanitation, are not keeping pace with the needs of this growing population. I can vouch for the fact that the water quality has decreased over the past few years and power cuts are constant; these issues are only set to get worse and the life for the average Gazan is set to get more difficult if Gaza's issues are not resolved. More food stuff and a greater number of cars being shipped in through the Kerem Shalom border crossing from Israel does not help resolve the key issues that that continue to affect Gaza. Without a drastic change to the blockade these key problems will remain and will only get worse as the population grows.
The tunnel trade has been the driving force behind all of the building. Construction materials are all but impossible to get from Israel and are hugely expensive when compared to the price of resourses coming from Egypt via the tunnels. The Gazan economy is still dependant on Israel. Imports have increased in volume from Israel recently, including the number of automobiles, however, the majority of all building materials still come through the tunnels. Prices can fluctuate, doubling overnight because of crackdowns on the Egyptian side of the border. It has been estimated that up to 60 percent of the estimated 1,000 smuggling routes under the border have been closed. Egypt has stated that it was cutting arms smuggling that was destabilizing the Sinai peninsula. However, Egyptian forces recently seized 20,000 liters of fuel ready to be smuggled into Gaza. Hamas is working with Egypt to improve the situation but things remain difficult. Hamas are optimistic in the long run; however, they understand that Egypt has its own problems and it will take time for any real improvements to be made. Morsi is struggling to keep control and Gaza is low on the list of their priorities.
Politically, Hamas are focused on the now stalled unity talks. There is a belief that uniting the Palestinian factions will put them in a stronger position politically. The Arab spring sent a signal, and after participating in a democratic process in January 2006 Hamas want to keep some form of legitimacy. This is why they want the coalition talks to succeed. A unity government ensures Hamas still has the legitimacy to rule that it feels it gained through the 2006 elections. However, legitimate or illegitimate, it is unlikely that anyone will be able to snatch the Gaza Strip from their control. The Hamas enclave, even though filled with dissenting voices, has given the organisation a taste of power and they are unlikely to relinquish their control. Their popularity in the West Bank is of more importance. If presidential election were held now, Hamas would most likely win.
The reconciliation process is difficult, no date for the resumption of talks has been set and the talks that were held were only cosmetic. However, there is optimism that there will be a way forward in the Hamas ranks. This optimism is not translated to the general populous, many of whom believe the bad blood created in 2007 will be too great to overcome. Hamas has blamed the breakdown of the Cairo talks on two problems. The first, confidence. There is still understandable distrust between Fatah and Hamas. Brutal actions in the past are hard to forget. The second is there is a disagreement over the process. Hamas think that Abu Mazen is not fully concentrating on the reconciliation process, that he has one eye on the peace process, America and Israel. However, to Hamas, the peace process is dead, pointless. They expect a right wing government in Israel and for things to remain the same. To them it doesn't matter what happens with the elections in Israel, they have seen many faces come and go and do not expect for there to be any movement politically. They view a unity government as far more important.
Support for Hamas is thin in Gaza. If elections were held it would be likely that Hamas would lose out to Fatah in the Gaza strip but win in the West Bank. There is a lack of hope in the younger sections of society. An apathy towards politics. Many young Palestinians have resigned themselves to a life of repression, conflict and pain. They see no solution to the situation and certainly no solution that would be fair. Without any process leading to the almost dead concept of a two-state solution, all that can be seen is the continuation of the status quo. For Palestine this means continuation of the resistance movement and not a political solution. With continuation of settlement expansion in the West Bank and the establishment of the E-1 plan, the concept of a two-state solution is even more difficult to conceive.
The case of Prisoner X
Until recently, the identity and existence of ‘Prisoner X’ in Israel was considered a myth. After much pressure, the government partially lifted the ban on reporting details of the imprisonment of Prisoner X, a ban imposed by an Israeli court after his arrest. Prisoner X was widely reported to be 34-year-old Ben Zygier. Zygier, who held both Australian and Israeli citizenship, was depicted as an agent of Israel’s Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations, otherwise known as the Mossad; he was arrested in Israel in 2010 on unspecified acute charges. It has been said that the secrecy surrounding Zygier was so great that his prison guards were informed of neither his offence, nor his name.
In the 1990s, Zygier moved to Israel and was then recruited by the Mossad. The Mossad were eager to enlist individuals who held dual nationality, as it meant the individual could travel freely without needing to connect themselves to Israel. Zygier died in 2010, apparently hanging himself in the solitary confinement cell he occupied, which had originally been designed for Yigal Amir, assassin of the then Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. The Israeli government refuses to comment on Zygier, and only confirmed his identity well after his death. If the claims made by the Australian broadcaster ABC are correct, the Zygier case represents a serious breach for the Mossad as an agency. Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli Prime Minister, has since acknowledged the issue but stresses that Israel’s security needs demanded that some information be kept secret.
The secrecy surrounding this case has led to speculations that Zygier was denied a fair trial or representation suggesting that Israel has breached international law. Under Article 6 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the UN General Assembly, states that it is a fundamental right for an individual to have a fair trial. Nevertheless, Israel has ratified the declaration, by being a UN member state upon its creation in 1948. According to Avigdor Lieberman – Foreign Minister at the time - the prisoner’s rights were respected.
The reports of Zygier’s treatment and his suicide in Ayalon Prison have caused problems for Australia. The country’s government has since been forced to admit that they were briefed over the case since his detention in February 2010. Previously, they had claimed to know nothing of Zygier's detention and death until his family asked for help to repatriate his body. Australia's Foreign Minister, Bob Carr, stated that Australia had been assured of Zygier's safety. It is also believed that Zygier was not the only agent who took advantage of the Australian law allowing individuals to change their name every 12 months and apply for a new passport each time. Zygier changed his name three times in total.
Michael Ross, a former Mossad agent, calls Zygier’s repatriation, induced identity changes and solitary confinement under its particular circumstances ‘scandalous’. It does seem as though like Israel has crossed three key boundaries. Zygier, who worked for Mossad, was asked not to give up his Australian citizenship, creating a conflict of interest; he was sent to operate in Australia under his true identity. This jeopardised Israel’s relations with Australia, as well as all other nations for which it used foreign passports for, because any espionage committed will be recorded on the foreign passport. Future Israeli action will inevitably draw greater external scrutiny.
The 9-Year Anniversary of the 2004 Qamishli Kurdish Uprising in Syria
Hejar asked us to post the following:
Nine years have passed since the Kurdish uprising occurred in Qamishli and other Kurdish areas in Syria, and Syrian Kurds are still in need of equal rights and self-determination. Since the start of the Syrian Revolution in 2011, the Kurds also took part in the revolution, but the Syrian opposition did not take into consideration the Kurdish issue. How and when will the Kurdish question be answered in Syria? and How do Syrian Kurds see themselves in the new Syria? We will address these questions in the meeting entitled: "The 9-Year Anniversary of the 2004 Qamishli Kurdish Uprising in Syria" which will take place at the House of Lords on the 12th March. This meeting is hosted by Lord Ahmed and organized by Youth of the Syrian Revolution in UK along with the Kurdish National Council and the Syrian Kurdish Center. Places are limited. Please contact Hejar Ibrahim Moustafa to register at: syria-uk@hotmail.com
Nine years have passed since the Kurdish uprising occurred in Qamishli and other Kurdish areas in Syria, and Syrian Kurds are still in need of equal rights and self-determination. Since the start of the Syrian Revolution in 2011, the Kurds also took part in the revolution, but the Syrian opposition did not take into consideration the Kurdish issue. How and when will the Kurdish question be answered in Syria? and How do Syrian Kurds see themselves in the new Syria? We will address these questions in the meeting entitled: "The 9-Year Anniversary of the 2004 Qamishli Kurdish Uprising in Syria" which will take place at the House of Lords on the 12th March. This meeting is hosted by Lord Ahmed and organized by Youth of the Syrian Revolution in UK along with the Kurdish National Council and the Syrian Kurdish Center. Places are limited. Please contact Hejar Ibrahim Moustafa to register at: syria-uk@hotmail.com
The Death of the Two-State Solution?
The following notes are from Samuel Morris, currently in Gaza on behalf of the NCF. Sam has been travelling in Israel and Palestine for much of the past month and these are his observations. As with all such comments from NCF sources, they and should be treated as a personal view, rather than an NCF perspective:
2013 has been touted by many as the year to solve the Israeli-Palestinian issue. The combination of a new American administration and the apparent surprise win by the centrist parties in the Israeli elections, meant that some thought the stars had aligned and a solution, or the beginning of one, might be on the cards. However three months into the year things do not look quite as positive.
The way that the elections were represented as a centre left success was flawed. Yes, Yesh Atid and Yair Lapid were big winners but whatever the outcome of the coalition talks, the new government will still be right of centre. The only difference will be the political make-up of the coalition, not policy. The shape of the the coalition ultimately doesn't matter. The issues that will be argued over are the draft for military service, the relationship between the secular and the orthodox and impending budget cuts - not the Palestinians.
The shift to the centre, politically, has only really involved a handful seats. The right-bloc may have got smaller but it has got harder, especially in relation to the settlements issue. An interesting footnote however is that this election may have signalled the end of the Russian voting bloc in Israel. Netanyahu made a mistake by joining with Yisrael Beitinu and creating a heavily right-wing list. However, Netanyahu was still the winner and is still in the driving seat. It was Likud as a party that took the hit.
This new voting shift reveals a new trend. The demise of the old elites within Israel. The big names from the secular Ashkenazi political establishment have been overtaken by the rise of a new elite. Bennett and Lapid are both examples of this trend. Young and modern, they represent these new elites of the Israeli right and centre.
Though the Israeli electorate is concerned with Israel's international image and with its isolation from the international community, Palestine itself was not the issue in this election. The Israeli electorate had other things on their mind. Ultimately, the unprecedented social movements that Israel has witnessed over the last couple of years, were translated into votes at the ballot boxes.
Bringing Livni into the coalition is seen as a message from the prime minister to US President Barack Obama that Israel is serious about the peace process. Especially with Obama soon to make his first appearance in Israel. Livni is likely to play a role similar to that of outgoing Defence Minister Ehud Barak in smoothing relations between Netanyahu and Obama. Livni's presence in the coalition is a coup for Netanyahu; now he can go on to form a right wing coalition while appeasing the Americans with the hollow olive branch of Livni to deal with the Palestinians. If Netanyahu can overcome the bad blood between himself and Bennet, then he will be able to form a coalition. Bennet and Lapid have reservations about joining a coalition with the Haredi parties. Both want to pass laws changing the status of the ultra-orthodox in Israel, something that would be impossible in a coalition with the Haredim. The strength of the Lapid-Bennet alliance may force Netanyahu to exclude Shas and the Haredim. The negotiations have become a staring contest. Who will blink first? Whatever the outcome, this makes bad reading for anyone who hoped 2013 would be the year for a break though in finding an achievable Middle East peace process.
There may be a genuine desire to reinstate 'the peace process', but in reality this means nothing. The resumption of the peace process means the resumption of the status quo not a step forward on the road to peace. Bilateral peace process negotiations are dead in the water whether Livni believes in them or not, and may be more harmful than no negotiations at all. Both Iran and the key regional issues in regard to Syria and Egypt rank higher on Israel's to-do-list than Palestine. However, if a reasonable deal was placed on the table, the majority of the Israeli public would accept it. The issue is that there is no one on the Israeli side to initiate such a deal and no Palestinian to accept it. Time is not on the side of the Palestinians. The policy of Israel toward Palestine is one of keep as much as you can for as long as you can. Ultimately, the concept of a two state solution is slowly slipping away. The only way that this can be changed is by the involvement of the international community.
There is now more security in Israel, with fewer attacks and a high level security apparatus now in play. For the first time since 1973 there have been no Israeli deaths in the West Bank or Jerusalem. The limitation of Palestinian control to a handful of Palestinian Authority "islands" in the West Bank is seen as a better situation than handing over full authority. There is a view that withdrawal from territory creates conflict. The examples of Gaza and South Lebanon are often cited as reasons not to withdraw from further areas. The political will to provide the Palestinians with a state is currently very weak. Security is the word that has dominated Israeli politics in recent years, not peace. However this ignores the fact that peace not only brings security, but stability.
The only way for Israeli politicians to feel the need to step into meaningful negotiations is if they have something significant to gain. The Abdullah Plan was a missed opportunity. It showed that the Arab states were willing to engage meaningfully with Israel, and would have provided the infective Arab League with a purpose. If it had been built upon, instead of being flatly rejected, the current situation could have been more positive. With the Palestinians third on priority list for the Israeli political elite, after Iran and Syria, a comprehensive peace plan is the only way forward. It may be the only framework within which to resurrect the dying concept of a two state solution, as it would provide Israel with considerable trade and security benefits at a time when Israel has major concerns over the changing face of the Middle East.
It is still uncertain how the escalation of Palestinian protests over the past few days will affect any ongoing negotiations to establish a governing coalition in Israel. There are worrying signs that the West Bank and Gaza are on the verge of a third intifada, and these signs have been there for a while. With the current state of Israeli-Palestinian relations, the lack of any political solution and Israel's policy of settlement expansion in the West Bank, a third intifada seems sadly inevitable, if things continue as they are. All this tinder box needs is a spark. Whether the recent death of Arafat Jaradat will provide that spark, has yet to be seen.
2013 has been touted by many as the year to solve the Israeli-Palestinian issue. The combination of a new American administration and the apparent surprise win by the centrist parties in the Israeli elections, meant that some thought the stars had aligned and a solution, or the beginning of one, might be on the cards. However three months into the year things do not look quite as positive.
The way that the elections were represented as a centre left success was flawed. Yes, Yesh Atid and Yair Lapid were big winners but whatever the outcome of the coalition talks, the new government will still be right of centre. The only difference will be the political make-up of the coalition, not policy. The shape of the the coalition ultimately doesn't matter. The issues that will be argued over are the draft for military service, the relationship between the secular and the orthodox and impending budget cuts - not the Palestinians.
The shift to the centre, politically, has only really involved a handful seats. The right-bloc may have got smaller but it has got harder, especially in relation to the settlements issue. An interesting footnote however is that this election may have signalled the end of the Russian voting bloc in Israel. Netanyahu made a mistake by joining with Yisrael Beitinu and creating a heavily right-wing list. However, Netanyahu was still the winner and is still in the driving seat. It was Likud as a party that took the hit.
This new voting shift reveals a new trend. The demise of the old elites within Israel. The big names from the secular Ashkenazi political establishment have been overtaken by the rise of a new elite. Bennett and Lapid are both examples of this trend. Young and modern, they represent these new elites of the Israeli right and centre.
Though the Israeli electorate is concerned with Israel's international image and with its isolation from the international community, Palestine itself was not the issue in this election. The Israeli electorate had other things on their mind. Ultimately, the unprecedented social movements that Israel has witnessed over the last couple of years, were translated into votes at the ballot boxes.
Bringing Livni into the coalition is seen as a message from the prime minister to US President Barack Obama that Israel is serious about the peace process. Especially with Obama soon to make his first appearance in Israel. Livni is likely to play a role similar to that of outgoing Defence Minister Ehud Barak in smoothing relations between Netanyahu and Obama. Livni's presence in the coalition is a coup for Netanyahu; now he can go on to form a right wing coalition while appeasing the Americans with the hollow olive branch of Livni to deal with the Palestinians. If Netanyahu can overcome the bad blood between himself and Bennet, then he will be able to form a coalition. Bennet and Lapid have reservations about joining a coalition with the Haredi parties. Both want to pass laws changing the status of the ultra-orthodox in Israel, something that would be impossible in a coalition with the Haredim. The strength of the Lapid-Bennet alliance may force Netanyahu to exclude Shas and the Haredim. The negotiations have become a staring contest. Who will blink first? Whatever the outcome, this makes bad reading for anyone who hoped 2013 would be the year for a break though in finding an achievable Middle East peace process.
There may be a genuine desire to reinstate 'the peace process', but in reality this means nothing. The resumption of the peace process means the resumption of the status quo not a step forward on the road to peace. Bilateral peace process negotiations are dead in the water whether Livni believes in them or not, and may be more harmful than no negotiations at all. Both Iran and the key regional issues in regard to Syria and Egypt rank higher on Israel's to-do-list than Palestine. However, if a reasonable deal was placed on the table, the majority of the Israeli public would accept it. The issue is that there is no one on the Israeli side to initiate such a deal and no Palestinian to accept it. Time is not on the side of the Palestinians. The policy of Israel toward Palestine is one of keep as much as you can for as long as you can. Ultimately, the concept of a two state solution is slowly slipping away. The only way that this can be changed is by the involvement of the international community.
There is now more security in Israel, with fewer attacks and a high level security apparatus now in play. For the first time since 1973 there have been no Israeli deaths in the West Bank or Jerusalem. The limitation of Palestinian control to a handful of Palestinian Authority "islands" in the West Bank is seen as a better situation than handing over full authority. There is a view that withdrawal from territory creates conflict. The examples of Gaza and South Lebanon are often cited as reasons not to withdraw from further areas. The political will to provide the Palestinians with a state is currently very weak. Security is the word that has dominated Israeli politics in recent years, not peace. However this ignores the fact that peace not only brings security, but stability.
The only way for Israeli politicians to feel the need to step into meaningful negotiations is if they have something significant to gain. The Abdullah Plan was a missed opportunity. It showed that the Arab states were willing to engage meaningfully with Israel, and would have provided the infective Arab League with a purpose. If it had been built upon, instead of being flatly rejected, the current situation could have been more positive. With the Palestinians third on priority list for the Israeli political elite, after Iran and Syria, a comprehensive peace plan is the only way forward. It may be the only framework within which to resurrect the dying concept of a two state solution, as it would provide Israel with considerable trade and security benefits at a time when Israel has major concerns over the changing face of the Middle East.
It is still uncertain how the escalation of Palestinian protests over the past few days will affect any ongoing negotiations to establish a governing coalition in Israel. There are worrying signs that the West Bank and Gaza are on the verge of a third intifada, and these signs have been there for a while. With the current state of Israeli-Palestinian relations, the lack of any political solution and Israel's policy of settlement expansion in the West Bank, a third intifada seems sadly inevitable, if things continue as they are. All this tinder box needs is a spark. Whether the recent death of Arafat Jaradat will provide that spark, has yet to be seen.
AFGHANISTAN CIVILIAN CASUALTIES DOWN
For the first time in 6 years, casualty figures in Afghanistan have declined. According to the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), there has been a 12% decrease in civilian casualties with a slight increase in injuries.
This is due to a harsh winter which saw fewer suicide bomb attacks, fighting on the ground and air operations. However, this is rather misleading and does not mean that threats against Afghan men, women and children have diminished. Civilians continue to face threats, intimidation and interference from armed militant groups.
Jan Kubis, the UN special representative in Afghanistan, claimed that seeing the recent decrease in casualty numbers granted temporary relief but the “human cost of the conflict remains unacceptable.” He further added that it is mainly women and children who continue to suffer the most from the effects of armed conflict while engaging in everyday activities with an increase of 20% in those killed and injured.
In 2012, 81% of civilian casualties were a result of improvised explosive devices laid by insurgents and 8% from operations by pro-government forces. The report also states that targeted killings by militants increased by 108%.
Although the number of Afghans killed by NATO-led forces dropped by 40%, a recent UN report stated that hundreds of Afghan children have been killed by US air strikes over the last 4 years. The numbers especially doubled between 2010-2011 due to the “lack of precautionary measures and use of indiscriminate force.” This led President Hamid Karzai to ban the Afghan military from requesting aerial support from NATO-led forces.
The recent figures generated mixed feelings among the Afghans who were more concerned about security with some even claiming that the UN was biased in its research. For now, it seems that the Taliban have shifted their focus to targeting foreign troops.
To date 14, 728 Afghans have lost their lives.
Syria Current Events Update
On the 21st of February 2013, a car bomb explosion went off in the central Mazraa neighbourhood of Damascus. Many have died and are wounded from the car bomb attack, the current total figure stands at fifty-three dead and around two-hundred people injured. Our thoughts and prayers are with them.
BACKGROUND CASUALTY FIGURES
CASUALTY FIGURES - WEEK ENDING 3rd FEBRUARY 2013
CIVILIAN CASUALTIESWe have counted unidentified bodies as civilian casualties and we have included them on the day the bodies have been found.
Mon 28SYRIAN OBSERVATORY FOR HUMAN RIGHTSVIOLATIONS DOCUMENTING CENTRESYRIAN ARAB NEWS AGENCYDAMASCUS CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTSLOCAL COORDINATION COMMITTEESSYRIAN SHUHADAHOMS37
115DEIR EZZOR12
63DAMASCUS PROVINCE526
3347DERA’A56
86IDLIB216
2416ALEPPO317
2818HAMA
11
1914LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ9
RAQQA
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
1
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL2886NANA129109Tues 29
HOMS108
2310DEIR EZZOR34
74DAMASCUS PROVINCE1730
3729DERA’A1215
2513IDLIB55
74ALEPPO74110
118127HAMA99
119LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ15
RAQQA
HASAKEH
2
2QUNEITRA
1
1TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL145184NANA228199Wed 30
HOMS1311
15DEIR EZZOR
3
DAMASCUS PROVINCE1724
4232DERA’A64
38IDLIB610
139ALEPPO3425
3933HAMA
7
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ6
RAQQA
33HASAKEH25
61QUNEITRA
1
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL8479NANA117101Thu 31
HOMS
6
127DEIR EZZOR
1
31DAMASCUS PROVINCE
49
5858DERA’A
2
42IDLIB
1312ALEPPO
11
1224HAMA
11LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
6HASAKEH
16QUNEITRA
1
TARTOUS
1SWAIDA
TOTALNA69NANA105118Fri 1
HOMS23
664DEIR EZZOR
652DAMASCUS PROVINCE218
333429DERA’A54
673IDLIB61
773ALEPPO734
222922HAMA13
561LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ5
RAQQA
HASAKEH
2
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL2863NA879464Sat 2
HOMS135
567DEIR EZZOR3
344DAMASCUS PROVINCE844
635847DERA’A45
675IDLIB59
11119ALEPPO1619
212519HAMA23
453LATAKIA
22REEF DIMASQ25
RAQQA
1
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL7685NA11411896Sun 3
HOMS914
121613DEIR EZZOR32
781DAMASCUS PROVINCE613
383631DERA’A36
574IDLIB99
131311ALEPPO3039
364143HAMA56
12134LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ5
RAQQA
7
66
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL7096NA129140107
REBEL CASUALTIES
Mon 28SYRIAN OBSERVATORY FOR HUMAN RIGHTSVIOLATIONS DOCUMENTING CENTRESYRIAN ARAB NEWS AGENCYDAMASCUS CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTSLOCAL COORDINATION COMMITTEESSYRIAN SHUHADA
HOMS
62
DEIR EZZOR242
DAMASCUS PROVINCE
9
DERA’A122
IDLIB16
ALEPPO
710
HAMA
2
LATAKIA2
REEF DIMASQ10
RAQQA
HASAKEH
15
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL163721NANANATue 29
HOMS71115
DEIR EZZOR35
DAMASCUS PROVINCE27
DERA’A885
IDLIB14
ALEPPO535
HAMA32
LATAKIA
12
REEF DIMASQ4
RAQQA
2
HASAKEH
12
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL334231NANANAWed 30
HOMS61812
DEIR EZZOR44
DAMASCUS PROVINCE
95
DERA’A
47
IDLIB561
ALEPPO42
HAMA333
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ18
RAQQA
HASAKEH6
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL464628NANANAThu 31
HOMS
6
DEIR EZZOR
2
DAMASCUS PROVINCE
1722
DERA’A
3
IDLIB
ALEPPO
2
HAMA
1
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTALNA3122NANANAFri 1
HOMS221
DEIR EZZOR45
DAMASCUS PROVINCE11614
DERA’A
1
IDLIB1
10
ALEPPO4610
HAMA23
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ16
RAQQA
HASAKEH
2
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL303535NANANASat 2
HOMS11
DEIR EZZOR
DAMASCUS PROVINCE423
DERA’A11
IDLIB12
ALEPPO13
HAMA11
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ18
RAQQA
2
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
1
SWAIDA
TOTAL2734NANANANASun
HOMS42
DEIR EZZOR56
DAMASCUS PROVINCE
32
DERA’A43
IDLIB44
ALEPPO95
HAMA79
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ32
RAQQA2
HASAKEH
1
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL6762NANANANA
GOVERNMENT CASUALTIES
Mon 28
SYRIAN OBSERVATORY FOR HUMAN RIGHTSVIOLATIONS DOCUMENTING CENTRESYRIAN ARAB NEWS AGENCYDAMASCUS CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTSLOCAL COORDINATION COMMITTEESSYRIAN SHUHADAHOMS
2DEIR EZZOR5
4DAMASCUS PROVINCE
9DERA’A2
2IDLIB
6ALEPPO
7HAMA
1LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ6
RAQQA
1HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL13NANANANA32Tue 29
HOMS5
10DEIR EZZOR11
4DAMASCUS PROVINCE6
8DERA’A6
9IDLIB2
3ALEPPO9
1HAMA3
2LATAKIA
1REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
HASAKEH
2QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL42NANANANA40Wed 30
HOMS2
15DEIR EZZOR
3DAMASCUS PROVINCE6
8DERA’A4
IDLIB17
7ALEPPO4
2HAMA
3LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ6
RAQQA
HASAKEH3
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL42NANANANA38Thu 31
HOMS
6DEIR EZZOR
2DAMASCUS PROVINCE
12DERA’A
2IDLIB
ALEPPO
1HAMA
1LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTALNANANANANA24Fri 1
HOMS3
1DEIR EZZOR8
2DAMASCUS PROVINCE9
8DERA’A
2IDLIB
ALEPPO7
2HAMA4
2LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
HASAKEH
2QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL31NANANANA19Sat 2
HOMS2
DEIR EZZOR2
DAMASCUS PROVINCE13
24DERA’A
1IDLIB5
1ALEPPO9
2HAMA4
1LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
4HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
1SWAIDA
TOTAL35NANANANA34Sun 3
HOMS3
3DEIR EZZOR6
6DAMASCUS PROVINCE10
26DERA’A2
2IDLIB3
2ALEPPO6
2HAMA10
7LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA5
5HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL45NANANANA53
CIVILIAN CASUALTIESWe have counted unidentified bodies as civilian casualties and we have included them on the day the bodies have been found.
Mon 28SYRIAN OBSERVATORY FOR HUMAN RIGHTSVIOLATIONS DOCUMENTING CENTRESYRIAN ARAB NEWS AGENCYDAMASCUS CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTSLOCAL COORDINATION COMMITTEESSYRIAN SHUHADAHOMS37
115DEIR EZZOR12
63DAMASCUS PROVINCE526
3347DERA’A56
86IDLIB216
2416ALEPPO317
2818HAMA
11
1914LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ9
RAQQA
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
1
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL2886NANA129109Tues 29
HOMS108
2310DEIR EZZOR34
74DAMASCUS PROVINCE1730
3729DERA’A1215
2513IDLIB55
74ALEPPO74110
118127HAMA99
119LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ15
RAQQA
HASAKEH
2
2QUNEITRA
1
1TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL145184NANA228199Wed 30
HOMS1311
15DEIR EZZOR
3
DAMASCUS PROVINCE1724
4232DERA’A64
38IDLIB610
139ALEPPO3425
3933HAMA
7
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ6
RAQQA
33HASAKEH25
61QUNEITRA
1
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL8479NANA117101Thu 31
HOMS
6
127DEIR EZZOR
1
31DAMASCUS PROVINCE
49
5858DERA’A
2
42IDLIB
1312ALEPPO
11
1224HAMA
11LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
6HASAKEH
16QUNEITRA
1
TARTOUS
1SWAIDA
TOTALNA69NANA105118Fri 1
HOMS23
664DEIR EZZOR
652DAMASCUS PROVINCE218
333429DERA’A54
673IDLIB61
773ALEPPO734
222922HAMA13
561LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ5
RAQQA
HASAKEH
2
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL2863NA879464Sat 2
HOMS135
567DEIR EZZOR3
344DAMASCUS PROVINCE844
635847DERA’A45
675IDLIB59
11119ALEPPO1619
212519HAMA23
453LATAKIA
22REEF DIMASQ25
RAQQA
1
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL7685NA11411896Sun 3
HOMS914
121613DEIR EZZOR32
781DAMASCUS PROVINCE613
383631DERA’A36
574IDLIB99
131311ALEPPO3039
364143HAMA56
12134LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ5
RAQQA
7
66
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL7096NA129140107
REBEL CASUALTIES
Mon 28SYRIAN OBSERVATORY FOR HUMAN RIGHTSVIOLATIONS DOCUMENTING CENTRESYRIAN ARAB NEWS AGENCYDAMASCUS CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTSLOCAL COORDINATION COMMITTEESSYRIAN SHUHADA
HOMS
62
DEIR EZZOR242
DAMASCUS PROVINCE
9
DERA’A122
IDLIB16
ALEPPO
710
HAMA
2
LATAKIA2
REEF DIMASQ10
RAQQA
HASAKEH
15
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL163721NANANATue 29
HOMS71115
DEIR EZZOR35
DAMASCUS PROVINCE27
DERA’A885
IDLIB14
ALEPPO535
HAMA32
LATAKIA
12
REEF DIMASQ4
RAQQA
2
HASAKEH
12
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL334231NANANAWed 30
HOMS61812
DEIR EZZOR44
DAMASCUS PROVINCE
95
DERA’A
47
IDLIB561
ALEPPO42
HAMA333
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ18
RAQQA
HASAKEH6
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL464628NANANAThu 31
HOMS
6
DEIR EZZOR
2
DAMASCUS PROVINCE
1722
DERA’A
3
IDLIB
ALEPPO
2
HAMA
1
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTALNA3122NANANAFri 1
HOMS221
DEIR EZZOR45
DAMASCUS PROVINCE11614
DERA’A
1
IDLIB1
10
ALEPPO4610
HAMA23
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ16
RAQQA
HASAKEH
2
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL303535NANANASat 2
HOMS11
DEIR EZZOR
DAMASCUS PROVINCE423
DERA’A11
IDLIB12
ALEPPO13
HAMA11
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ18
RAQQA
2
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
1
SWAIDA
TOTAL2734NANANANASun
HOMS42
DEIR EZZOR56
DAMASCUS PROVINCE
32
DERA’A43
IDLIB44
ALEPPO95
HAMA79
LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ32
RAQQA2
HASAKEH
1
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL6762NANANANA
GOVERNMENT CASUALTIES
Mon 28
SYRIAN OBSERVATORY FOR HUMAN RIGHTSVIOLATIONS DOCUMENTING CENTRESYRIAN ARAB NEWS AGENCYDAMASCUS CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTSLOCAL COORDINATION COMMITTEESSYRIAN SHUHADAHOMS
2DEIR EZZOR5
4DAMASCUS PROVINCE
9DERA’A2
2IDLIB
6ALEPPO
7HAMA
1LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ6
RAQQA
1HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL13NANANANA32Tue 29
HOMS5
10DEIR EZZOR11
4DAMASCUS PROVINCE6
8DERA’A6
9IDLIB2
3ALEPPO9
1HAMA3
2LATAKIA
1REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
HASAKEH
2QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL42NANANANA40Wed 30
HOMS2
15DEIR EZZOR
3DAMASCUS PROVINCE6
8DERA’A4
IDLIB17
7ALEPPO4
2HAMA
3LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ6
RAQQA
HASAKEH3
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL42NANANANA38Thu 31
HOMS
6DEIR EZZOR
2DAMASCUS PROVINCE
12DERA’A
2IDLIB
ALEPPO
1HAMA
1LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTALNANANANANA24Fri 1
HOMS3
1DEIR EZZOR8
2DAMASCUS PROVINCE9
8DERA’A
2IDLIB
ALEPPO7
2HAMA4
2LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
HASAKEH
2QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL31NANANANA19Sat 2
HOMS2
DEIR EZZOR2
DAMASCUS PROVINCE13
24DERA’A
1IDLIB5
1ALEPPO9
2HAMA4
1LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA
4HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
1SWAIDA
TOTAL35NANANANA34Sun 3
HOMS3
3DEIR EZZOR6
6DAMASCUS PROVINCE10
26DERA’A2
2IDLIB3
2ALEPPO6
2HAMA10
7LATAKIA
REEF DIMASQ
RAQQA5
5HASAKEH
QUNEITRA
TARTOUS
SWAIDA
TOTAL45NANANANA53
