Here is another interesting paper, authored by Ata Qaymari, Ari Rath's Palestinian partner in the presently dormant "Partners for Peace' website:

Scenarios and Policy Options for the Palestinians - 2008

I. Introduction

The following paper represents a scenario-building initiative that presents the wide-range of policy options available to the Palestinians in 2008. The paper is a compilation of the ideas that! were disseminated and discussed at two meetings sponsored by Bringing Peace Together earlier this year, a May 29th joint Israeli-Palestinian meeting at the Ambassador Hotel in Jerusalem, as well as a second July 22nd Palestinian meeting at the St. George Hotel in East Jerusalem. The paper will present both the positive and negative aspects of each potential policy option. The initiative is based upon the following assumptions:

1- nbsp; The parties are currently engaged in seemingly serious negotiations led, monitored, and encouraged by the United States, according to the understandings set forth at Annapolis, with the goal of reaching an agreement before the end of President Bush's term in 2008.

2- There are deep and substantive gaps in each party's positions on the negotiated issues.

3- The three parties involved are dealing with internal political considerations that serve to either hinder or promote the peace process:

· The United States administration is driven by a strong urge to leave a legacy of achievement and set forth a basis for peace that the new administration can work to implement.

· Israel faces a serious political crisis that might require the holding of new elections, thereby potentially hindering the achievement of an agreement.

· Palestinians face a political and geographic split that hinders the possibility that a comprehensive peace, covering Gaza and the West Bank, will be reached.

4-&! nbsp; The international community views the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as part of a wider set of concerns in the region.

5- The potential participation of new actors, such as Syria and/or Iran, could affect the process in different ways.

6- Building scenarios for different situations, and developing action plans that articulate strategies for the different parties, is a vital part of the peace process.

7- Policy proposals for Palestinians and Israelis should be based on the assumption that both parties will continu! e to live in the region, even if negotiations collapse.

8- Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas' term ends on January 9th, 2009, so Palestinians will hold new elections at the beginning of the next year.

II. Options

The following represents a list of the potential Palestinian policy options for the coming months, until the end of the year:

1) Stop all negotiations with Israel and declare the negotiating process futile;

Potential Negatives: President Abbas has remained committed to an international process, with a specified time limit. Thus, quitting the negotiation process before the end of the year will undermine Abbas' political legitimacy and credibility. Many, including the United States and Israel, are likely to blame the! Palestinians as unprepared and incapable of working for peace.

2) Continue the negotiations, to avoid blame for abandoning the negotiating track;

Potential Negatives: This option will merely preserve the status quo, and will lead to the degradation of the PA by rendering it completely dependent upon the good will of others.

3) Change course in negotiations, to achieve less challenging goals. Palestinians could launch a campaign showing the futility of the process, and pursue an alternative plan calling for any of the following options:

· A state with provisional borders, an option which would have local and international legitimacy, as a part of the Road Map,

Potential Negative! : The provisional borders may become the final solution agreement.

· A new temporary agreement, Oslo III, to include:

- Withdrawal to the lines of 28/9/2000;

- Upgrading of Oslo II zone divisions: Zone B becomes A, and zone C becomes B;

- Commitment to respecting Palestinian jurisdiction in zones A and B;

- Evacuation of outposts and the settlements;

- Removal of the Israeli-American veto against achieving Palestinian unity, and requiring Israel and the United States to respect any further election results in Palestine.

· A new Israeli unilateral disengagement from parts of the ! West Bank, including the dismantling of outposts and settlements.

4) Keep the Tahde'a, extend it to the West Bank, and challenge Israel by demanding complete national independence through peaceful means. The Tahde'a with the PA in the West Bank could pote! ntially restore legitimacy to PA authority, and establish PA jurisdiction in the West Bank. This option seems possible after the Tahde'a in Gaza, which all organizations have accepted;

5) Solve the internal dispute by unifying the people. As long as the split between Hamas and Fatah continues, there is no prospect for peace. An agreement between Fatah and Hamas would improve conditions for the Pales! tinian people, even if a final peace agreement with Israel is not signed.

Potential Negatives: Israel and the United States oppose this option. This option will provoke another period of boycotts, sanctions, and the de-legitimization of Palestinian government. Furth! ermore, neither Hamas, which seeks legitimacy for its control of Gaza, or Fatah, which seeks renewed legitimacy for the President, is likely to accept this option.

Should the peace negotiations fail, the Palestinians have the following policy options:

1) Declare independence unilaterally, following model of Kosovo model;

Potential Negatives: While this option looks appealing, it is difficult to envision that such an approach could be successful, given the divisions, corruption, economic dependence, and lack of leadership in Palestinian society. Furthermore, while this approach would fit the ethos of self-determination and personal freedom, it contradicts the idea of liberating the land. Israel would be happy if the Palestinians declared a state, and left Israel the rest of the territory.

2) Keep the status quo, preparing for the future and leaving a space for the new administrations in the United States and Israel to propose a new track;

Potential Negatives: Keeping the status quo would do nothing to meet the coming challenges.

3) Dissolve the PA, and give all PA authority to either Jordan and Egypt or to an authorized Arab or international body (i.e., the trusteeship option, creating an international mandate or some type of international intervention).

Potential Negatives: While this approach might attract positive international attention, it contradicts the fundamental goal of Palestinians' taking fate into their own hands. This approach will arouse strong opposition, especially by Hamas, who will see this as a conspiracy to undermine its control and pave the way for a future corrupt regime to take over. Furthermore, no Arabs would be willing to assume authority over the occupied territories, thereby becoming the new occupiers against local opposition. ! Trusteeship would be a retreat from Palestine's current semi-independent status.

The long-term policy options available to the Palestinians are:

1) Remain committed to the two-state solution and develop new strategies for achieving it. While the two-state solution is currently in a state of crisis, as the two sides are not willing to compromise over a new line of partition of Palestine, there is a possibility that the two-state solution could be revived, either by a Palestinian concession (i.e., accept the Israeli offer), or by international intervention and pressure on Israel to withdraw to lines accepted by the Palestinians. If a compromise is not reached, Israel will continue settlement expansion, while Palestinians continue to suffer under the occupation.

2) Adopt a one-state solution in one of its different forms: a bi-national state, a democratic state, or annexation with autonomic authorities;

Potential Negatives: The one-state solution is already prevailing in Palestine. A truly democratic one-state solution without racial discrimination is a utopian vision, likely impossible to achieve. A one-state solution that comes without the end of Zionism as a racial movement would represent a total and final capitulation, for the Palestinians. Giving the land to Israel, despite calling the reg! ion Palestine, would represent a victory for Zionism. While this idea could be advocated as a tactic, to force the Israelis to accept the Palestinian two-states vision, Israel could also use this tactic against the Palestinians, convincing the world that Palestinians do not actually want independence.

3) Transfer the Palestinian issue to Jordan, giving Jordan the responsibility for either reclaiming the occupied territories or finding an alternative solution with the Arab League.

Potential Negatives: Jordan would not be willing to assume this control, as it currently maintains a peace treaty with Israel. Temporary Arab League trusteeship could be a better alternative, but what territory would the Arab League rule over? Would Israel agree to withdraw to the 1967 boarders, even to "moderate" Arab rule in the region? Furthermore, Palestinians do not want others to rule over them.

III. Conclusions

Palestinians are split, weak, and defeated, while Israel remains strong, well-supported, and arrogant. Over time it has become clear that neither the Arab League nor the international community is ! willing to make real sacrifices on behalf of the Palestinians (i.e., sending troops to Gaza to fight Hamas or pressuring Israel to withdraw).

Palestinians should lower their expectations of the outcome of the official negotiating process, and instead pursue more realistic goals. The best option for the Palestinians will be to work to solve the internal dispute by bridging the internal rift between Fatah and Hamas and forming a new and credible group of leadership that is focused on achieving smaller, more tangible goals. Indeed, the creation of a Palestinian state will not occur immediately. Thus Palestinians, including Hamas, should agree to pursue mor! e temporary agreements (i.e., Tahde'a, then Hudna, for another temporary agreement of disengagement that will upgrade the political status of the land and citizens of Palestine). New Palestinian leadership could work to achieve stateship status, which would place Palestinians on an equal footing with others, even if this state does not fulfill all of Palestinians' territorial ambitions.

The one-state solution is an illusion, and annexation, transfer to surrounding countries, or trusteeship represents a retreat. Thus, ultimately, changing the track of negotiations, in cooperation with Hamas, is the best option. This can be achieved by keeping the Tahde'a, and extending it to the West Bank, thereby challenging Israel with a national demand for independence through peaceful means.

The ideas expressed in this paper represent those of the author and do not represent Bringing Peace Together.